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Summary
Much attention in the development of artificial team-mates has focused on replicating
human qualities and performance. However, all things being equal, do human players
respond in the same way to human and artificial team-mates – and if there are differ-
ences, what accounts for them?
Related research has examined differences using direct comparisons of responses to
human and AI partners in conversational interactions, competitive games, and in the
cooperative game context.
However, the work to date examining the effects of team-mate identity has not been
extensive and previous attempts to explain the findings have not sufficiently examined
player beliefs about their team-mate or the rationale and motivation for behavior. This
thesis reports on research to understand differences in player experience, perception,
and behavior when human players play with either human or AI team-mates in real-
time cooperative games.
A number of experiments were conducted in which the subjects played a computer
game involving an unseen team-mate whom they were told was a human or a com-
puter program. Data gathered included performance logs, questionnaires, and in-depth
interviews.
Participants consistently rated their enjoyment higher with the “presumed human” (PH)
team-mate and rated it more favorably – higher in cooperation, skill, and noticed more
risk-taking by the PH team-mate. PH team-mates were given more credit for successes
and less blame compared to their AI counterparts. In terms of behavior, players pro-
tected the PH team-mate more in a game involving few decisions, yet players protected
AI team-mates more in a complex cooperative game involving sustained effort and
constant decision-making.
In order to explain why the identity of the team-mate results in different emotional,
evaluative, and behavioral responses, an original Cooperative Attribution Framework
was developed. The framework proposes that the player considers the intentions and
attributes of their team-mates and also considers the pressures and motivations of the
player in the larger social context of the interaction.
Using the Cooperative Attribution Framework, this thesis argues that the differences
observed are broadly the result of being unable to imagine that an AI team-mate could
have certain attributes (e.g., emotional dispositions). One of the more surprising as-
pects of this insight is that the “inability to imagine” impacts decisions and judgments
that seem quite unrelated (e.g., credit assignment for objectively equivalent events).
This thesis contributes to the literature on artificial team-mates by revealing some of the
differences in response to human and computer team-mates in cooperative games. In
order to explain these differences, a framework is developed and applied to our studies,
and justified through its application to the results of related research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Artificial team-mates are becoming more common in the context of work and play. In
addition to the technical challenges of designing such team-mates, it is also important
to identify and understand various dimensions that impact our acceptance (or not) of
artificial team-mates.
Since very little research has been done to describe and explain human responses to ar-
tificial team-mates, this thesis contributes to these efforts by increasing our understand-
ing of motivations behind responses to human and computer team-mates. We approach
this issue by exploring the perceptions, judgments, and behaviors toward team-mates
that are believed to be controlled by either a human or a computer. Specifically, it ad-
dresses the question: with all things being equal, do human players respond in the same
way to human and artificial team-mates – and if there are differences, what accounts
for them?
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the topic of social responses to technology
in order to provide background for the thesis concerns and focus. Specifically, we
summarize research that has tried to determine whether, how, and why people treat
technology as social actors. Among this work are findings that suggest minimal social
cues cause people to treat computers using the same social rules they use for people
[85, 19]. Although these lines of research provide background for this thesis, they
only provide evidence of general tendencies for people to treat computers socially and
they therefore serve more as a point of departure for this research. We are focused
on exploring not just tendencies or relative differences, but the actual differences in
response to team-mates using direct comparisons between human and computer agents.
This chapter concludes by providing an outline of the document as a whole.
1.1 Social responses to technology
It is more and more common for computers to fulfill various roles and duties that tra-
ditionally belonged to people, and to some degree, computer agents are becoming ac-
cepted as social agents [93]. Early research in language processing systems (e.g., Eliza
[102]) provided some of the first evidence that people will treat computers socially
and ascribe social abilities to them. More recent research within the Computers Are
Social Actors (CASA) paradigm [74] and the threshold model of social influence [18]
1
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have formalized and proposed explanations for how and why people treat computers
socially.
The media equation theory [85] proposes that “media = real life”, meaning that with
minimal cues, people will treat media according to the same social rules they use
for interacting with people. These researchers initially conducted experiments with
a computer-based tutor [75] and referred to this assignment of human attitudes, inten-
tions, or motives to non-human entities as ethopoeia [74] and coined a more simple
phrase to summarize the effects, Computers Are Social Actors (CASA). Researchers
went on to demonstrate through various studies that humans would react to computers
socially in a wide range of contexts and tasks, for example, feeling flattered by software
agents, accepting a computer as a team-mate, and various others summarized in [85].
As an example of the form typical of their studies, consider the social rule about po-
liteness, “When a person asks about himself/herself, the human subject will give more
positive responses than when a different person asks the same questions.” Researchers
then substituted a computer for the person and conducted the experiment again. The
researchers compared the differences in the feedback that participants gave directly
to that same computer to the feedback they provided to a different computer. Their
findings revealed more polite responses when providing feedback directly to the com-
puter that was being evaluated [75]. They went on to explore many other social rules
and gathered much evidence that suggests that people can be induced to behave as if
computers were human, even though they know that computers don’t actually have
“selves” or human motivations, and surprisingly, this would happen even with very
minimal cues. In [71] the researchers modified their claims of “media = real life”
to suggest that a continuum of the social responses to computers is a better model.
They proposed “weak” and “strong” forms of the CASA effect. The “weak form” is
identified as results that suggest people follow the same rules to guide their behavior,
but does not claim that the responses are identical, while the “strong form” is identi-
fied as results that suggest that there is no comparative difference between humans an
computers. Most studies follow and demonstrate the “weak form”, usually identifying
moderators to the media equation effects.
There are a few main explanations that have been proposed for results that follow the
CASA paradigm, including: users in a state of mindlessness, the computer as a proxy
for a programmer, and anthropomorphism. Nass and Reeves claimed that the human
brain has not evolved fast enough to account for advanced technology and therefore,
when placed into a situation involving social cues by media, the only way the human
knows how to respond is to follow the automatic social rules that are used for human so-
cial interactions [85]. Similarly, “mindlessness,” which refers to a mental state in which
a human participates in an activity with little conscious awareness to all the details, re-
sults in the person treating technology socially without giving conscious attention to
doing so [49, 57]. Another possible explanation for the media equation effects, “com-
puter as proxy”, involves the concern that people interact with a computer, but they
imagine that they are interacting with the programmer. This was discounted in [92],
with findings that suggest that when people interact with computers, they don’t imagine
that they are interacting with the programmers, but they in fact consider the agent as a
social entity. Another possible explanation for media equation effects is the tendency
for people to imbue human qualities in various things, which is known as anthropo-
morphization. This is a popular claim in the development of life-like conversational
agents [26].
Although the studies following the CASA paradigm provide compelling results over a
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range of important interaction contexts, there are key limitations. Most notably, CASA
studies nearly always involve testing the “weak” form of the social responses [71] and
do not make direct comparisons between human and computer agents or discuss the
degree of social influence.
While the CASA paradigm proposes that the quantity of social cues result in social
responses, Blascovich [18] proposed a model to explain the social influence of tech-
nology based on the quality of social cues. He proposed that it is obvious that other
humans will be treated socially, yet for artificial agents, the degree to which they are
treated socially depends on the ‘behavior realism’ of their actions. Blascovich pro-
posed the Threshold Model of Social Influence, which claims that humans interact with
media socially when a threshold is reached. That threshold was proposed to be mod-
erated by the degree of agency (whether the media artifact seemed to be a human or
an agent)1 and behavioral realism (the degree to which agents behave as they would
in the physical world) as shown in Figure 1.1. The model was amended to include the
behavioral response system – varying degrees of conscious attention involved in the
activity (degree to which the task is automatic or deliberate) [19].
Figure 1.1: Threshold of social influence model by Blascovich [18]
Blascovich and related researchers have reported on studies of social responses that
support their model in studies of virtual environments [10, 20], and have suggested
that more social cues lead to a greater social response [96].
Although there has been research on whether, how, and why people will treat media
according to the same social rules they use for interacting with people, there has been
very little work done that explores possible differences in how people treat humans and
computers. Furthermore, there has been virtually no work on developing a theoretical
framework for explaining such differences. The next chapter looks at previous research
that has been done to directly compare responses to human and computer agents.
1Researchers have used a number of different terms to differentiate the identity of a computer agent and
a human, including “agency” and “perceived ontology.” This thesis uses the word “identity” except when
quoting or referring to researchers who use the alternate terms.
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1.2 Structure of this document
The rest of this document is structured as follows:
• Having discussed the topic of social treatment of technology as a point of depar-
ture for the general area of focus, research that has involved direct comparisons
of conversational, competitive, and cooperative interactions is reviewed (Chap-
ter 2).
• This is followed by an articulation of the research problem (Chapter 3), and
a description of the research method, which consists of a series of game-based
studies that were carried out to measure various differences in response to human
and computer team-mates (Chapter 4).
• The individual studies examine how the framing of team-mate identity impacts
the emotional evaluations of enjoyment and preference (Chapter 5), and judg-
mental evaluations of credit/blame assignment and skill assessment (Chapter 6),
perceived levels of cooperation, and risk-taking by team-mates (Chapter 7). Two
studies are then presented that examine behavioral differences in protective ac-
tions taken on behalf of team-mates (Chapter 8), and decisions related to sacri-
ficing team-mates (Chapter 9).
• An explanatory framework for understanding the responses to team-mates in the
cooperative game studies (Chapter 10) is presented.
• The results of the studies – as well as the results of other studies from the related
work – are analyzed in terms of the framework (Chapter 11).
• The thesis concludes by discussing some limitations of this research, implica-
tions for the development of artificial agents and some thoughts on the topics for
future research (Chapter 12).
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss research that goes beyond the demonstration of tendencies
for social responses and has examined actual differences in response to human and
computer agents by conducting studies that involved direct comparisons.
As previously discussed, there has been much interest in examining how people re-
spond to artificial agents – and media in general. There are compelling and interesting
findings that provide a background for the current research. In the CASA studies, the
basic proposal with the ethopoeia model is that minimal social cues result in social
responses to technology, while the work of Blascovich’s Threshold Model of Social In-
fluence proposes that those perceived as human are automatically treated socially and
agents are treated socially in relation to how human-like their behaviors are perceived.
These two models seem at odds with each other – one proposes that the identity does
not matter and the other proposes that it is a crucial factor. This calls for a more focused
review of the literature that has examined responses to humans and artificial agents.
Most of the media equation research examines the “weak form” of the computers are
social actors paradigm, that is, most of the research does not rely on direct comparisons
between human and computer agents, but instead examines differences between two or
more interactions with a computer agent, which are then compared to differences in
two or more interactions with a human. As noted in [71], the weak form compares
relative differences between the human and computer agent experimental conditions,
but allows for wide differences in actual responses to human and computer agents.
The supposed reason for avoiding the examination of actual differences is due to a
sense of human primacy, that is, humans are believed to possess qualities that are
unique and superior, thus differences are taken as fact, without further investigation.
The focus of this thesis is to examine the effects of the manipulation of identity of
the team-mate for equivalent interactions, thus side-by-side comparisons are required.
One of the main explanations for the media equation results is that the human responds
to minimal cues automatically due to “mindlessness”, or not giving attention to the
identity of who or what they interact with. Coordination with a team-mate in a fast-
paced cooperative game, however, is essentially a mindful, ongoing task that involves
careful consideration about the team-mate’s capabilities and intentions. As noted in
recent neuro-imaging research, scientists have come a long way in being able to read
the brain activity of people, yet it is not able to identify exactly what people are mindful
of in complex situations. Therefore, much research continues to focus on self-reported
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feedback and differences in behavior to understand the rationale and motivation for
responses to team-mates.
Some of these examples of comparative work involve mild deception – participants
are told that their partner is a human or a computer when in fact it is otherwise. This
is usually done so that the stimuli for the experimental conditions are of otherwise
equivalent interactions and to quickly build and evaluate systems without the need
for programming complex components as noted in [29]. In this review of the related
research, “presumed human” is used to refer to an artificial agent that is presented to
the participant as being a human-controlled avatar, and “presumed computer” is used to
refer to a human-controlled avatar that is presented to the participant as being controlled
by a computer agent.
This body of related work involving direct comparisons can be broadly grouped into
three categories of studies including 1) conversational interactions 2) competitive in-
teractions and 3) cooperative interactions. These works present evidence for various
differences in the responses to human and computer agents, which motivates the user
studies conducted as part of the present thesis research. We now examine the related
research.
2.1 Conversational Interactions
There has been considerable attention in the research that has examined how people
respond to artificial conversational agents compared to other humans either in person
or represented as an avatar in a mediated environment. Research suggests more posi-
tive emotional and judgmental responses to human partners compared with computers.
Differences in behavior include findings that suggest with human conversational part-
ners, subjects engage in more reciprocal matching, engage in more natural language,
speak for a longer period of time and engage in more acknowledgements compared to
when communicating with a computer agent. Research also suggests that people en-
gage in more socially focused behaviors with human conversation partners, engaging in
more impression management with them, and generally communicating more politely
compared to equivalent interactions with computers. We now examine this research in
more detail.
2.1.1 Differences in Perception
Research on conversational interactions comparing human and computer agents pro-
vides evidence to suggest that people respond more positively to human partners.
Among the findings, human conversational partners are perceived as more trustwor-
thy, cause less stress, and are judged as funnier than computers.
In a study carried out by Nass et. al described in [73, 58], researchers set out to explore
responses to differences in ethnicity and identity of the computer mediated conversa-
tional partner. They conducted experiments in which research subjects interacted with
video representations of presumed human avatars and computer based embodied con-
versational agents (ECAs) that appeared to be of a similar or different ethnicity to the
research subject. While the participants were led to believe that the interactions were
real-time responses, in fact, they were all video recordings that were prepared ahead of
the experiment. This ensured that the experience was consistent across all subjects for
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each interaction. In the conversational interactions, the research subjects were faced
with a “choice/dilemma” situation in which they were given a description of a hypo-
thetical situation written in an information packet and were told to ask their conversa-
tional partner for their opinions of what should be done in the situation. For example,
the subjects would ask the ECA, “Do you think Mr. A (the person in the scenario)
should do B (one of the possible choices)?” At which point, the conversational partner
would respond with suggestions. After the response was received from the ECA, the
subject would fill out a questionnaire that measured various aspects of the interaction
including how similar the decision made by the ECA was to the decisions of the re-
search subject. They also rated their partner on social attractiveness, trustworthiness,
and quality of the arguments. The results of the study suggest that people react more
positively to avatars and agents that seem similar to them. They also found evidence to
suggest that subjects feel more “attitudinal similarity” to human partners. Human part-
ners were also rated more “trustworthy”, and curiously, they found that people agreed
more with the computer agent than with the human partner. In the discussion of their
results, the researchers draw attention to the fact that the pattern of responses to the dif-
ferences in ethnicity were present for interactions with presumed human and computer
conversational partners, and they signal that in future work, the “degree” of socialness
differences should be examined more closely [73].
In a simpler, goal-oriented text based interaction, research subjects who interacted with
computer and presumed human partners using text based chat we asked to explain dif-
ferences in pictures of geometric shapes to their partners and then answer questions
about their thoughts and feelings about the partners. Their findings suggest that part-
ners with an identity framed as a computer result in more interpersonal stress than
chat interactions with a presumed human [44]. The authors of that paper propose that
the differences are possibly due to a different schema being used for human and com-
puter conversational partners, however, they do not provide further details about this
proposal.
In research that examined humor with conversational partners, findings suggest that
people are less sociable, demonstrate less mirth, feel less similar to their interaction
partner, and spend less time on the task with the computer conversation partner com-
pared to a partner they believe is another human [71]. In that study, participants en-
gaged in text-based conversations focused on the Desert Survival Problem with pre-
sumed human and computer partners. In the control group interactions, no humor
was introduced and the subjects received informational responses from the interaction
partner. In the experimental group, the same informational comments were sometimes
augmented with jokes. The authors suggest that further research is needed to determine
the differences in response to the identity of the conversational partners, however, they
suggested the differences were likely due to a lack of social presence with computers,
noting that previous research in response to laugh tracks suggests that humor requires
the feeling of social presence, whether real or imaginary.
While the previously mentioned study suggests that an increased sense of social pres-
ences may be responsible for the different responses, research that compared the ex-
periences of interviewing a prospective human or computer team-mate suggests that
there is no difference in the feeling of presence or social presence related to the partner
identity [76].
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2.1.2 Differences in Behavior
Differences in behavior while interacting with presumed human and computer con-
versational partners include findings that suggest with human conversational partners,
subjects engage in more reciprocal matching, engage in more natural language, speak
for a longer period of time, and engage in more acknowledgements compared to when
communicating with a computer agent. Research also suggests people engage in more
socially focused behaviors with human conversation partners, engaging in more im-
pression management with them and generally communicating more politely compared
to equivalent interactions with computers.
In terms of effects on behavior, there are also a mix of studies suggesting similarities
and differences according to the identity of the partner. In a study by Miwa et. al
[69] participants responded with reciprocal matching in conversations with humans as
well as computers. However, in Oviatt et. al [78] children interacted with embod-
ied conversational agents differently than with humans, suggesting that they perceived
the computer agent as an “at risk” listener and they adjusted their speech to ensure
the computer could understand them. Researchers in earlier studies found evidence
to suggest that people adjust their conversation style with much shorter dialogue with
the computer agent [51]. Other researchers examining text-based communication gath-
ered evidence that suggests subjects make fewer acknowledgments with a computer
conversational partner compared to a presumed human partner [22].
Researchers examining conversational differences related to the Desert Survival Game
suggest that people engage more in attempts to establish an interpersonal relationship
when they think they are interacting with another human [89]. Similarly, in a study
with an interviewer identified as human, subjects engaged in heightened impression
management strategies, yet they did not do so with interviewers identified as computers
even though the content of the conversation from the interviewer was the same [4].
Research on tutorial systems provided evidence to suggest that students are more rude
to computers than tutors presumed to be human [38], while more recent work provided
additional evidence that students are more hostile toward computer tutors and engage
in more hedging and apologizing with human tutors [17].
2.2 Competitive Interactions
Research that has looked at differences in response to competitors in interactive games
suggests that people have a very different experience depending on whether they be-
lieve they are interacting with a computer or another human. Among these differences
are results that suggest that an increase in the sense of social presence with human
competitors results in more positive affect, enjoyment, and feelings associated with
flow. Additional studies suggest that aggression can be higher with computer team-
mates due to unsatisfied communication needs, while play against human competitors
is linked to more engrossed play. We now discuss these findings in more detail.
Preliminary results from a study of competitive gameplay using a version of Wood-
Pong suggest that there is more positive affect in interactions with humans because
of an increase in social cues and potential for communication [40], which has been
attributed to an “appetitive motivation” for social interaction that people have for inter-
action with other humans [84]. In that study, participants played against competitors
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in three configurations, once with a co-located human, once with a human in a sepa-
rate room joining over the network, and once with a computer competitor. Participants
filled out the Game Experience Questionnaire (GEQ) that was developed and described
in [30]. The researchers noted that future work should involve games that can provide
a consistent experience across all experimental conditions to enable more conclusive
findings.
In another study that compared the the difference in response to human and computer
competitors, a development toolkit for the game Neverwinter Nights was used to create
a game experience, which entailed fighting a competitor for five rounds. The game
experience was held objectively consistent for all subjects by ensuring that each par-
ticipant narrowly lost the battle. The participants filled out questionnaires and reported
a higher sense of presence, flow, and enjoyment when playing against another human
due to a greater sense of social presence [99].
Researchers have also studied how the identity of a competitor affects aggression
in digital games. In a study involving participants who played a CD-ROM version
of Monopoly against another human (face-to-face) or against a computer-controlled
player. The results of their study suggest that interactions with computer competitors
may result in higher levels of aggression due to a lack of human communication [103].
In their study protocol, however, the researchers note that respondents all played the
games in the room with other respondents, which they claim may have affected the
feelings of social presence aside from their interactions with their human or computer
team-mate.
Researchers have also begun to use biosignals to measure differences in response to
human and computer competitors in games. In research involving participants who
played a fast-paced digital hockey game against a friend and a computer, results from
the measurements of galvanic skin response (GSR) suggest that players invest more
emotionally in the game events with a friend compared to a computer. Their findings
suggest that there is greater physiological arousal with a human competitor due to more
engrossed play [61].
2.3 Cooperative Interactions
In terms of research on the effects of partner identity and cooperation, there is further
evidence to suggest that people react very differently when they perceive their part-
ner as either a computer or another human. Among these studies, there is evidence
to suggest differences in partner preference and liking, with more positive responses
to human partners, and evidence from studies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game sug-
gest that people commit more to human partners due to an imagined social contract.
There is also a growing body of research utilizing brain imaging that suggests there is
a neurological basis for the differences in response to human and computer partners.
Research that compared responses to human and computer-based musical partners us-
ing electronic drum machines suggests that people may prefer computer-based partners
under certain conditions. In their study, participants were asked to engage in collabora-
tive drumming improvisation for short periods of time with human or computer-based
partners led by a metronome to keep the overall tempo. Participants were free to create
whatever beats they desired during the drumming sessions and were asked to fill out
questionnaires about their experience playing with their partner. Their findings suggest
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that players who were less experienced preferred the computer partner because its form
of improvisation was more consistent, stable, and predictable [16].
In a study involving participants who engaged in a cooperative trading task with ei-
ther human or computer-controlled partners, the arousal levels of the participants were
higher with the presumed human partner compared to the presumed computer partner,
even though they were actually controlled by a human confederate each time [60]. In
that study, which utilized the popular World of Warcraft platform, participants traded
items from their personal inventory with their team-mates for a period of two minutes
and then answered questions about the experience. The findings from the study suggest
that participants feel more presence when they believe their team-mate is controlled by
a human compared to computer, leading to higher arousal in terms of heart rate and skin
conductance response. It is useful for this thesis because it suggests that the social ex-
pectations participants have for their team-mates significantly impacts their perception
of the same events.
An early example of research that compared player cooperation with human and com-
puter players measured the choices of players during 100 rounds of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game when paired up with either another unseen human team-mate or a com-
puter player [3]. Participants in their study chose to cooperate more when playing with
the human player (55%) than with the computer player (35%). Among their findings,
the self-reported feedback suggested that participants had very different experiences
with the team-mates even though they were controlled by the system in all cases. Play-
ers reported that the computer player was more rigid, less adaptable, less kind, more
competitive, and less honest than the human player. Considering that the player was a
computer in every round, this study illustrates how the expectations leading to an ex-
perience and especially the presumed identity of a team-mate, can significantly change
the perception and resulting behavior in otherwise identical situations. The researchers
in that study proposed that people build expectations for the game experience by con-
sidering what the game is capable of, what the partner is capable of, and what they
themselves are capable of, which helps them manage their decisions in the game.
In a well known study also involving the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, researchers
paired up the subjects with either another human player or one of three computer play-
ers [52]. The participants were able to communicate with their partner using specific
communication channels. In the human partner condition, participants were seated
across from a confederate researcher and played the game using voice communication.
In the computer partner conditions, the virtual partners communicated the same mes-
sages with the participants, however they were represented with different human-like
features, for example, one computer partner would communicate through text-based
chat, another used voice-based chat, and another used voice-based chat accompanied
by a visual representation of an on-screen artificial agent with an animated human-like
face. The partners continually asked the participants what their next move would be.
The participants’ behaviors relative to their commitments revealed significant differ-
ences between the conditions. The participants honored their commitments more with
a human partner compared to any of the computer partners. Results from interviews
suggest that with human partners, players consider and protect their social identity (be-
ing a good player) and feel more compelled to honor an imaginary social contract with
human partners.
In more recent brain imaging studies, participants played cooperative games with hu-
man and computer team-mates, revealing significant differences in the brain activity
depending upon the team-mate identity. In one such study, participants played the
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Prisoner’s Dilemma game while researchers used fMRI technology to analyze their re-
sponses. The results suggest that with human team-mates, there is stronger activation
in various social regions of the brain related to “mentalizing” (imagining the mental
states of their partner) compared to equivalent interactions with a computer partner
[54]. In another study that focused on the differences in brain activity associated with
social concerns, participants engaged in a decision-making task in the form of the Ul-
timatum Game [87]. In the experiment, participants were given a proposed split of $10
at each round. The split was determined at random by the partner and the participant
had to decide whether or not to accept the offer of the split or decline. The participants
were less likely to accept unfair deals from a presumed human partner compared to
equivalent deals offered by a computer. In that study, researchers gathered evidence to
suggest that brain activity associated with negative feelings were greater when the hu-
man proposed unfair deals compared with unfair deals offered by a computer. Further
support for neurological differences in response to humans and computers is discussed
in the Explanatory Framework Chapter 10.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter we reviewed related research involving user studies that examined di-
rect comparisons between responses to human and computer agents. While in the
Introduction of this thesis we presented work that suggests people treat computers and
humans following the same social rules, in this chapter, the degree of social response
was scrutinized in studies that focused on conversational interactions, competitive, and
cooperative interactions using direct comparisons. In the next chapter, we critique the
related work and present the research problem for this thesis.
Chapter 3
Research Problem
In this chapter, a critical review of previous work identifies various limitations, a fo-
cused research problem is presented, and discussion is provided regarding the original-
ity of the contribution to related research.
Although previous research has demonstrated differences in the response to human
and computer partners in cooperative interactions including arousal, liking, and brain
signals, the work to date examining the effects of framing team-mate identity has not
been extensive. Previous attempts to explain the findings have not sufficiently exam-
ined player beliefs about their team-mate or the rationale and motivation for behavior.
This thesis reports on research to understand how the framing of team-mate identity
results in differences in player experience, perception, and affects the rationale and
motivation for behavior when playing with either human or AI team-mates in real-time
cooperative games.
The specific research problem of this thesis is: to identify and explain crucial differ-
ences in player experience, perception, and behavior when human players play with
either human or AI team-mates in real-time cooperative games.
3.1 Context of cooperative games
This work is situated within a growing group of literature focused on studying coor-
dination and cooperation within video games. Much of the recent work has involved
studies of collaborative virtual environments (CVEs) and interactions between two or
more people in game worlds. Various ethnographic studies have examined the emer-
gent social interactions of CVEs suggesting that the design of the game world can
promote human to human interaction as noted in studies on “There” [23], Star Wars
Galaxy [34] and World of Warcraft (WoW) [35, 72].
Research is beginning to focus more on computer team-mates, especially as they be-
come more capable and sophisticated. There is also a growing interest in the develop-
ment of artificial team-mates in the research community to develop exciting games that
engage and entertain players when other human players are not available or to augment
mixed teams involving humans and agents. The wild popularity of games that involve
virtual team-mates (e.g. Left4Dead, World of Warcraft, social network games, etc.)
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suggests that players are, in fact, accepting virtual team-mates to some degree. Re-
searchers in the HCI community would like to understand how people cooperate and
socialize with virtual agents of all types, how to design them to be more effective part-
ners [33, 79], how they can make games more enjoyable, or design compelling virtual
agents for learning contexts [15].
Considering the growing interest in artificial team-mates, in the previous chapters we
examined background literature on the social treatment of technology and then we
described the related research that studied direct comparisons between responses to
human and artificial agents. We now critique the related work.
3.2 Critique of previous work
This section discusses the main concerns with the related research that has utilized
direct comparisons to examine responses to human and computer agents in conversa-
tional, competitive, and cooperative interactions.
While examples of research suggest that there are differences in response to human and
artificial agents in conversational, competitive, and cooperative contexts, there has not
been sufficient focus on real-time cooperative games that involve coordination between
team-mates against a shared opponent. Considering the popularity of games involving
team-mates and the efforts dedicated to the development of artificial agents, it is im-
portant to understand the factors that contribute to the acceptance of artificial agents.
A critical look at the comparative research provides motivation for the research focus
of this thesis.
Research on conversational interactions proposes that the main difference between how
people treat humans and computer agents is that with humans, there are more attempts
to establish social relationships and with agents, people adjust their speech to ensure
they are understood by these “at risk” partners. While these examples of research sug-
gest that there are differences in response to agents and humans in situations that in-
volve coordination and shared goals, the context of cooperative games is not addressed
aside from studies that have examined the simple negotiation of lists of items in the
turn-based studies using the Desert Survival Problem.
In competitive interactions, the main difference between how people respond to hu-
mans and computer agents is that with humans, there is more positive affect, greater
sense of social presence and potential for communication. Although there are many
examples of compelling findings focused on competitive games, there hasn’t been ad-
equate attention given to the cooperative game context and the explanations for the
differences have not addressed the affective/reflective feedback from research subjects
to understand differences in rationale and motivation.
In terms of research on cooperative interactions, among the main differences between
how people respond to humans and agents include overall higher levels of commitment
to human team-mates and an increase in social influence. Although there has been
much research that has examined the differences in response in games such as the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Dictator Game, these interactions are overly simple, turn-
based interactions that don’t reflect active coordination with team-mates. There has not
been much work that has examined typical real-time cooperative games that involve
joint coordination in a virtual space.
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The most relevant research is represented in Lim et. al [60], however, the cooperative
experience that is presented in their study doesn’t actually involve a game-like expe-
rience, but instead is more of a cooperative turn-taking conversational interaction that
is conducted inside the World of Warcraft game engine. In the results of that paper,
the lack of difference in enjoyment from one game session to the next could likely
be due to the game example being far too trivial, and perhaps perceived as a simple
on-screen task, not active cooperative gameplay with a team-mate. The authors of that
study acknowledge that this limitation is difficult to overcome because it entails con-
structing a scenario in which an AI algorithm can hold an experience constant, yet
provide a reasonable game experience. In their study, biosignals were measured pro-
viding interesting insights into the physiological arousal during gameplay, however, an
examination of the actual differences in the behaviors during the interaction and per-
ceptual differences resulting from the interactions is more important. In their study,
they do not report or analyze how the participants actually behaved during the coop-
erative task. This leaves open questions such as the following: 1) Did the subjects
trade items more quickly for one team-mate over another? 2) Did they respond more
positively by trading valuable items first? 3) What did the subjects feel about the inter-
action in terms of preference and how did they justify those feelings? These possible
avenues of investigation could have provided valuable insights into the rationale and
motivational differences with human and computer team-mates.
3.3 Originality of thesis contribution
In this section we discuss the originality of the thesis contribution. This research exam-
ines an interactive context that is becoming more common, yet not well represented in
the research: cooperation with human or computer-controlled team-mates in dynamic
real-time games. The contribution includes the empirical contribution of revealing
differences in response to human and computer team-mates and the theoretical contri-
bution of building an explanatory framework to make sense of the differences.
3.3.1 Empirical contribution
The empirical contribution of this thesis involves revealing some of the differences in
player experience, perception, and behavior when players cooperate with either human
or AI team-mates in games.
This research extends the research focused on the social responses to media made pop-
ular by the Media Equation research [85]. The CASA paradigm in that line of research
claims that social cues invoke and invite a social response – our research complicates
that model by asking subjects to articulate motivations for behaviors as well as beliefs
about the status of partner behaviors and psychology. This is to say, it asks not about
social responses to social technologies but rationale and motivation for their responses.
The Media Equation makes claims that are broad and sweeping, claiming that people
treat media and other humans according to the same social rules without realizing it
(“weak form” of CASA). The “weak form” of the CASA paradigm makes up the bulk
of the CASA studies, which focus on general social responses, not differences in the
degree of social treatment. The “strong form” of CASA, which considers any differ-
ences in the actual behavior, is not often represented in research. We engage with direct
comparisons between responses to humans and computers (“strong form” of CASA)
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and claim that, in various situations, players spend considerable effort trying to un-
derstand the capabilities of the team-mate and considering the social context, which
inevitably results in differences in perception, behavior, and evaluations.
The threshold model of social influence by Blascovich and Bailenson [19] claims that
identity is critically important, however, they focus on the richness of the social cues, as
if at some point, the human forgets about the differences entirely and treats an artificial
agent socially. Our research suggests that people encode memories differently when
cooperating with human and AI team-mates, which results in selective attention and
various biases in judgment.
This work also contributes to the research on cooperation with artificial partners in
games. The results of our studies highlight differences in response to team-mates de-
pending on the perceived identity in the context of real-time cooperative games. Previ-
ous research on cooperation in games has not examined this interaction context except
for recent work that involved an overly simplified cooperative task [60]. In that re-
search, participants simply traded inventory items for a period of two minutes with a
team-mate using the WoW game engine. This effectively resulted in a task that was not
very game-like, but a simple action and response task. The researchers of that study
acknowledged this as a limitation and noted that more complex game scenarios should
be used.
3.3.2 Theoretical contribution
Beyond the empirical contribution of revealing differences in response to team-mates,
this thesis presents an original explanatory framework that builds on relevant theories
from social psychology and cognitive science. The framework provides explanations
for the results of user studies presented in this thesis, but it also provides explanatory
power for the analysis of other research studies involving cooperation with human and
computer team-mates.
This work will benefit designers/development of artificial partners/assistants, as well
as researchers of human robot interaction, game design, and ambient intelligence. In
many cases, developers try to mimic human qualities in the artificial partner to pro-
vide engaging and adaptable agents. Our work suggests this goal is either unattainable
through replicating human qualities, or that “something more” needs to happen in ad-
dition to this to compensate for the different motivations and sensemaking that affect
how people respond to artificial agents.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we provided a critical review of previous work and presented a focused
research problem, and discussed the main empirical and theoretical contributions of
this thesis. We now describe studies we conducted in order to identify and explain
crucial differences in player experience, perception, and behavior when human players
play with either human or AI team-mates in real-time cooperative games.
Chapter 4
Method
To explore the responses to human and computer team-mates in cooperative games,
a variety of methods were used. Prototype cooperative games were developed with
collaborating members of our research lab, empirical studies were carried out using the
game prototypes, results were analyzed, and an original framework was developed to
explain the differences in response to human and computer team-mates.
In this chapter, we will discuss our choice of methods and provide details about how
we carried out the investigation. To understand and explain the differences in response
to human and computer team-mates in cooperative games, our efforts included the
following:
1. A series of quantitative and qualitative studies were conducted to explore the
four major dimensions of cooperation. The studies involved participants who
played a computer game with a team-mate that was presumed to be controlled
by a human or a computer program.
2. Previous frameworks that have attempted to explain cooperative interactions
were reviewed.
3. An original explanatory framework was developed based on related theories and
research from social psychology.
4. Our framework was then applied to our own studies and justified by applying it
to studies conducted in other research.
We will now describe each of these research efforts in more detail.
4.1 Mapping Our Studies to Explore Cooperation
In this section we propose a definition of cooperation and then map the user studies we
conducted to explore the four major dimensions.
Considering well known definitions from social psychology [8, 56, 32], our definition
of cooperation in team-mate games is as follows: “Team-mates contribute in one
way or another to the group’s outcome as partners sharing in the group’s struggles
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involved in achieving some common goal, with possible additional benefits aside
from the shared goal including social aspects of joint activity, relationship, etc.”
In Table 4.1 we indicate how each of the four major dimensions of cooperation corre-
spond to the research focus and map to the relevant user studies.
Dimensions
of cooperation
Research Focus How Studies Map
team-mates share a
common goal
How well does the team-
mate orient toward the
goal, understand the goal,
etc?
Cooperation/risk-taking
study (Chapter 7), Pro-
tection Study (Chapter 8)
measuring intention
benefits in addition to
stated goals
What do team-mates en-
joy? Is enjoyment de-
rived from social aspects
or sense of duty, joint ac-
tivity, etc?
Enjoyment/preference
study (Chapter 5) what




others at a personal cost
How much does it seem
the team-mates do it for
us, how much do we do
for the others? What is





study (Chapter 7), Pro-
tection Study (Chapter 8)
equal roles /
power distribution






Study (Chapter 9) to
examine unequal roles
Table 4.1: Dimensions of cooperation and the corresponding research focus and map-
ping of studies
In the next section we provide a more detailed overview of the individual studies con-
ducted as part of this thesis.
4.2 Overview of user studies
In order to explore the responses to human and computer-controlled team-mates in the
cooperative real-time game context, a series of game-based studies were conducted. In
most of these studies, participants played a game twice, once with a human team-mate
and once with a computer team-mate. Participants were asked to provide feedback af-
ter each session through scale rating or open-ended feedback, followed by comparative
questions after both sessions were completed. Self-reported data involved question-
naires and semi-structured interview questions that focused on emotional and judg-
mental evaluations of their team-mate and the cooperative game experience. In terms
of emotional evaluations, participants were asked to rate their enjoyment after each
session, and after playing with both a human and computer team-mate they were asked
to indicate which team-mate they preferred. In terms of judgmental evaluations, par-
ticipants were asked to assess the skills of their team-mate, to assign credit and blame
for success and failure events in the game, and rate the amount of cooperation and
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risk-taking behaviors of their team-mate. Participant behavior was tracked with game
logs, which captured the amount of protective behaviors they engaged in to help their
team-mate and their choices for sacrificing their team-mate. Participant beliefs about
their own behavior was also measured and compared to the logged data.
While other studies have focused on turn-based games for comparative studies, we
focus on games that require constant coordination and enable (but not require) the
team-mates to help each other. This elevates the proposed cooperative game context of
our studies beyond simple artificial tasks (e.g. trading items on a list [60]) and exposes
the players to a more complex scenario in which they must consider how much they
focus on doing only the minimum required tasks and to what extent they help their
team-mate.
Our research studies examine aspects of the cooperative game context in situations
where the team-mate is rather skilled, able to achieve, yet at the same time, not com-
pletely infallible. By keeping the performance of the team-mates objectively constant,
we focus on any subjective differences in the perception of team-mates and behavior
toward team-mates resulting from the framing of team-mate identity.
In order to isolate and measure the effects of team-mate identity on cooperation, the ex-
periments typically involved mild deception and took the following form: participants
played a computer game involving an unseen team-mate. The participants were told
either that the team-mate is controlled by a human or a computer program. After play-
ing the game, participants were asked questions about the game and their team-mates.
In all cases, the actual identity of the team-mate was the same. That is, even though
participants were told that the team-mate was either human or computer, it was the
computer in both cases. Said another way: there was no objective difference between
team-mates in terms of their behaviors or performance. A variation of this configu-
ration was used to explore credit and blame assignment such that participants played
with human confederate researchers but were told they were controlled by a computer.
In order to designate the identity of the team-mate as perceived by the research subject,
we use the following terms and abbreviations:
“presumed human” (PH) refers to a team-mate that the participant presumes to be
human-controlled
“computer team-mate (AI)” refers to a team-mate that is presumed to be controlled
by artificial intelligence
The mild deception was to ensure that any differences in the ways that the participants
described or reacted to the team-mate could be attributed to whether they believed the
team-mate was computer-based or human. The purpose was not to see whether or how
easily humans can be led to believe they are coordinating with other humans (e.g.,
variant Turing test). Using the same artificial team-mate through-out the study also
ensured that the participant’s team-mate would perform at a consistent level across all
play sessions, the importance of which is noted in [60].
These studies are now briefly described including a summary of the research protocols,
participant details, materials used in the studies, and the data gathered. More detailed
descriptions of each study are provided in the respective chapters. This chapter con-
cludes with discussion on the development toward, and justification of a framework for
the differences in perception and behavior.
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Enjoyment/Preference - This study examined the dimension of cooperation, in which
players can derive benefits outside of the achievement of the shared goals. Related
research has not examined enjoyment and preference extensively aside from a study
that involved a very simple task of trading items between team-mates [60]. To ex-
plore player enjoyment and team-mate preference, a study was conducted to determine
whether players report more enjoyment and prefer human or computer team-mates and
the reasons behind their evaluation. Participants played the Capture the Gunner (CTG)
game for two sessions, once with a presumed human and once with a computer team-
mate and were asked questions during and after the sessions.
Credit/Blame/Skill Assessment - This study examined two dimensions of coopera-
tion, namely that cooperative interactions often include the possibility of assisting oth-
ers at a personal cost and that there is an equal distribution of power. A qualitative
study was conducted to examine the assignment of credit/blame and the assessment
of team-mate skills and how this might differ depending on the identity of the team-
mate. Participants played the CTG cooperative game with either human or artificial
(AI) team-mates and answered questions at various times during and after the game
sessions.
Perception of Risk-taking/Cooperation - This study examined two dimensions of
cooperation – team-mates share a common goal and cooperative interactions often in-
clude the possibility of assisting others at a personal cost. Related research has not
extensively examined the perception of cooperation and risk-taking in real-time coop-
erative games, yet it seems to be an attribute that would be important in evaluating
cooperative game play. This study set out to explore any differences in how play-
ers report perceived levels of cooperation and risk-taking behaviors of their human or
computer team-mates and the reasons behind their evaluation. Participants played the
CTG game for two game sessions, once with a presumed human and once with a com-
puter team-mate, and at the end of each session rated how cooperative their team-mate
was and how many risks were taken by the team-mate on their behalf. After both ses-
sions were complete, subjects answered overall questions that focused on comparisons
between the two sessions.
Protecting Team-mates - This study also examined the cooperative dimensions of
team-mates sharing a common goal and that cooperative interactions often include the
possibility of assisting others at a personal cost. This study examined the differences
in the amount of protective actions taken for human and computer team-mates. In ad-
dition, the participants were asked to rate the amount of protective action they took for
their team-mates to determine if participants accurately perceive their own protective
behaviors. Participants played the CTG game for two game sessions, once with a pre-
sumed human and once with a computer team-mate. Participants could take explicit
actions to protect their team-mate by pressing a button on the keyboard drawing the
attention of the gunner away from their team-mate. Participants were asked at the end
of each session to indicate which team-mate they protected the most. After both ses-
sions were completed, participants were asked various questions related to stereotypes,
the sense of co-presence with human and computer team-mates, and gave open-ended
feedback in response to short video clips of team-mate behaviors.
Sacrificing Team-mates - This study also examined the cooperative dimensions of
team-mates sharing a common goal and that cooperative interactions often include the
possibility of assisting others at a personal cost. While the protection study focused on
equal distribution of power, this study pushes the balance in favor of the human player
and forces the human to decide whether or not to place their team-mate into a sacrificial
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position in order to further the team goals. Participants played the game Defend The
Pass (DTP) for two rounds of 5 games each, one round was played with a presumed
human and the other round of 5 games with a computer team-mate. Participants had to
choose the position of their team-mate at the beginning of each game, placing them in
either the protected position, or sacrificing them by placing them in the position that is
exposed to the oncoming monsters. Participants provided feedback through responses
to questionnaires after each session and again after all sessions were complete.
4.3 Game: Capture the Gunner
In most of the studies conducted in this thesis work, a simple interactive game called
Capture the Gunner (CTG) was used. The game was developed together with members
of the research lab (Teong Leong Chuah, Kevin McGee, Chris Ong, Aswin Thomas)
and was first described in [2]. The game was intended to provide research subjects
with an interesting cooperative game experience, yet with built-in tools to facilitate
conducting research studies. This enabled logging of in-game events, a researcher
console to control the study sessions, one or more client consoles for the research
subjects, and network capabilities to enable cooperation between two people in separate
locations.
CTG is comprised of a simple, two-dimensional virtual environment, two cooperative
team-mates and one shared opponent as shown in Figure 4.1. This is a simple coop-
erative game which can be played with one research subject a) paired up with either a
human or computer team-mate b). Together, they must evade bullets and cooperate in
order to “capture” (touch) the gunner c), which is rotating and firing within its “field of
view” d) from the middle of the game space. At each level, both players must touch the
gunner (though, not necessarily at the same time); once this occurs, the game proceeds
to the next level, with the gunner rotating faster as described in [2].
Figure 4.1: Capture the Gunner game elements: a) human-controlled avatar b)
computer-controlled agent c) gunner d) gunner’s field of view (FOV)
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Two variations of the CTG game were used. One variation had an explicit mechanism
that players could use to draw attention from the shared opponent described in [65]
as “drawing fire”, while the other variation did not have this mechanism. The varia-
tion that included signalling was used for the studies including: Enjoyment/Preference
(Chapter 5), Cooperation/Risk-taking (Chapter 7), Protection (Chapter 8). The varia-
tion without this explicit signalling was used for the Credit/Blame/Skill study (Chap-
ter 6). The explicit “draw fire” feature is now described in more detail followed by
a description of the algorithm for the gunner, which was the shared opponent in both
game variations.
4.3.1 Drawing Fire
Players can protect their team-mate by “drawing fire”, which is an action that attracts
attention from the gunner, encouraging it to shift focus and actively target that player.
This can be done by moving into the field of view of the gunner or, the more explicit
way of drawing attention of the gunner requires the player to press the “W” key while in
the field of view of the gunner, which is described to the participants as a metaphor for
“yelling” at the gunner. The “yell” action causes the player’s avatar to blink yellow for
two seconds to indicate the elevated attempts to draw attention as shown in Figure 4.2.
The AI team-mate is programmed to draw attention in both ways at regular intervals.
Game event data is logged for each session including the levels achieved, number of
deaths, and actions taken by both team-mates including the number of “yell” events.
Figure 4.2: Avatar blinking yellow to signal “draw fire”
4.3.2 Gunner Behavior Algorithm
The game is designed so that the gunner is a challenging and somewhat unpredictable
opponent that can be influenced by player actions.
In the variation that did not involve explicit team-mate signalling for drawing fire, the
gunner algorithm was controlled as described in [2]. At the beginning of each level,
the gunner scans the screen by rotating around until both players have been spotted
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by entering its field of view. From that point forward, the gunner uses the distance
from itself to the team-mates to determine the amount of time it will spend on targeting
and shooting at each team-mate. After the time elapses, the gunner determines which
player is closest, and then selects either player to target, favoring the closest team-mate
in its field of view.
In the variation that involved the “yell” feature for explicit team-mate signalling, the
gunner behavior uses a different algorithm. The gunner has two actions that it can
perform: rotating to target the players – and firing bullets to strike the players. The
gunner seeks out both players equally at the beginning of each level. It rotates until
one of the players is in its field of view, at which point it begins firing at that player.
Every three seconds, a dice roll is made (not visible to the players), which results
in the gunner choosing either to stay with the current target, or to pursue the other
player using odds that begin at 50/50. The players can influence the likelihood of being
targeted by positioning their avatar in the gunner’s field of view and performing the
“yell” action. With each yell event, the odds shift 10% in favor of targeting the player
who has yelled. This shift in odds is not visible to the player, who is told that the
yelling action is a more explicit way to draw the attention of the gunner to protect their
team-mate. The participants are simply told that “yelling” will likely raise the desire
for the gunner to target them.
4.4 Game: Defend the Pass
The game Defend the Pass (DTP) was used for the Sacrifice study 9; its features will
now be described in detail. The study called for a cooperative game that allows the
human participant to cooperate with a human or with a computer team-mate. DTP was
designed specifically for this study together with members of the Partner Technologies
Research Group (Teong Leong Chuah, Kevin McGee, Chris Ong). Controls of the
game included mouse for selection and advancing through the instruction screens and
keyboard input to fire at opponents. Each player is represented as a simple avatar:
green for the participant and blue for the team-mate. The objective of the game is for
both team-mates to cooperate and kill an army of 30 monsters that are placed at random
on the screen, and descend down the screen attempting to escape through a pass that
the players are defending as shown in Figure 4.3.
The health level of each player is indicated on a vertical bar along with their inventory
of bullets they can use to kill the monsters. Players begin with 100 bullets, which are
used to shoot the monsters when they come within range. Players shoot from right to
left along the row their avatar is positioned by pressing the up arrow on the keyboard.
During the game, the research subject must place their teammate in one of two possible
positions as shown in Figure 4.4 by selecting the desired position with the mouse.
In position 1 (Pos 1), the team-mate is placed in a “protected” position, where they
can fire at oncoming monsters without taking damage from them. In position 2 (Pos
2), the teammate is placed in a “sacrificed” position, becoming an obstacle in the pass
and acting as a “choke point”, forcing the monsters to move through the reduced gap
between the two avatars. This slows the monsters down and makes them easier to hit.
However, because the team-mate is exposed to the monsters, that team-mate receives
damage for every monster that touches it. The game does not end when the team-mate
dies. Its avatar will change to reflect this status and will no longer shoot. Even though
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Figure 4.3: Screenshot of the Defend the Pass (DTP) game screen
Figure 4.4: Positions that team-mates can be placed (Pos 1 & 2)
the teammate is dead, the surviving player is still able to shoot and kill monsters, and
the game ends when all the monsters are killed or have escaped. Each time a monster
is hit by a bullet, its green health bar is reduced by one unit. After taking four hits
the monster dies and disappears from the game space. Each monster killed awards the
team 10 points. Each monster that escapes penalizes the team by 55 points. The points
gained and lost are reflected through a running score that updates in real-time during
gameplay, and is cumulative across all 5 games played with a team-mate. At the end
of each game, participants are presented with a screen that shows a summary of their
performance during that game, detailing the status of the team-mate, the score at the
start of the game, the number of monsters killed, the number of monsters escaped, and
the score at the end of the game as shown in Figure 4.5.
4.5 Toward an explanatory framework
One of the goals of this thesis is to develop an explanatory framework that provides a
deeper understanding of the differences in how players respond to human and computer
team-mates. The results of the studies and analysis informed the development of the
explanatory framework. The framework was then used to assess related research stud-
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Figure 4.5: Screenshot of the score shown at the end of the Defend the Pass (DTP)
game
ies to validate its effectiveness for explaining other reported differences in the response
to human and computer team-mates.
4.5.1 Framework Development
Relevant theories and findings from social psychology, cognitive science, and HCI
informed the foundation elements of the explanatory framework. The results from the
user studies conducted in this study refined the categories that make up the framework
to ensure that it provides a general structure to assess a wide range of cooperative
interactions. The application of the framework to the timeline of the typical experience
was guided by the comparative studies conducted and described in this thesis.
4.5.2 Framework Validation
The framework was developed and tested against the results of the user studies reported
in the author’s own research. In order to validate the effectiveness of the framework
as an explanatory tool for use in explaining the results of other research, it was also
applied to the results of other studies that have examined responses to human and com-
puter team-mates. The validation exercise provided further insights into the refinement
of the framework and identified additional studies that could be conducted to continue
the refinement and validation process. The framework is an attempt to provide a tool for
structuring future assessments, and therefore, should be continually refined and tested,
challenged and expanded. The details of the user studies that informed this initial de-
velopment are described in the next five chapters – they represent a series of studies
focused on cooperation with one other team-mate in a fast-paced virtual space. The
games are simple, yet go beyond the overly simplified interactions of previous studies
using the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Desert Survival Problem. The aim is that these
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studies help to build a basic tool, and serve to stimulate ideas for the necessary future
studies to keep the refinement of the framework active, thus yield an explanatory tool
that becomes more useful with time.
Chapter 5
Enjoyment & Preference
In this chapter we present the details of the study examining how participants make
emotional evaluations in rating their enjoyment and preference for human and com-
puter team-mates. The findings suggest that people enjoy cooperative games more
with human team-mates and prefer the human over a computer team-mate. The rea-
sons for the enjoyment and preference include claims that the human team-mate is
more understanding, adapts more to the situation, and provides the player with more
social benefits compared to playing with a computer team-mate. Potential problems
with the study are also discussed.
5.1 Motivation
As previously identified, in Chapter 4 an important component of cooperation – and
likely in many games – is that the players may derive some kind of benefit aside from
the explicitly stated goals (e.g. social benefits of gaming [72, 34, 35, 23]). In fact,
games are traditionally thought of as outlets for entertainment, that, regardless of the
actual rules and objectives, should be enjoyable. Previous research has examined the
differences in enjoyment with human and computer competitors, with findings that sug-
gest playing against a friend results in a more enjoyable game experience with different
physiological responses than when playing against a computer [61]. Similarly, in [60],
subjects self reported liking the presumed human competitor more than the computer
competitor, however in that study, the level of liking was not significantly different in
a cooperative game.
In order to explore this dimension, a quantitative study was conducted in which partic-
ipants played a real-time, cooperative game then answered questions about the game
experience. The details of this study are now presented.
5.2 Study Details
This study was focused on identifying differences in the preference and self-reported
level of enjoyment while cooperating with presumed human and computer team-mates.
This study was described in [65], however key details of the study are now presented.
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5.2.1 Participants & Materials
The 40 participants who took part in the study included 26 female and 14 male stu-
dents between the ages of 20 and 25 with an average age of 21.7 years. When asked
to rate their experience and skill level with interactive digital games, the results were
fairly evenly distributed: 10% claimed to be novice, 25% claimed to have little experi-
ence (less than average), 45% claimed to have average experience, 12.5% claimed to
have much experience (more than average), and 7.5% claimed to be expert. Nearly all
participants (97.5%) reported that they enjoy interactive digital games.
For this study, the Capture the Gunner game that included the explicit “draw fire” sig-
naling through the keyboard activated “yell” feature was used as previously described.
5.2.2 Study Session Protocol
Participants arrived at a private testing room, did not meet any other participants, and
were assured that their comments would be kept anonymous and not revealed to other
human participants. Each participant was briefed on the game, read a description of
the game objectives and explanation of the “yell” feature, which was identified as an
additional way of attracting attention of the gunner. The participants then watched a
short video illustrating the game and the “yell” feature.
Participants then played the game for three sessions. The first session was to familiarize
the participants with using the controls (e.g., to ensure they understood and could acti-
vate the “yell” action). This was followed by two sessions of eight minutes each, one
with an AI team-mate and another with a PH team-mate. During the eight minute ses-
sions, the participants were told to do as well as possible and achieve the highest level
they could within the allotted time. If the team lost on any level, the game was reset to
the first level and the participant was asked to continue playing until the eight minutes
of the session had elapsed. The order of the eight minute sessions was balanced and
randomized to minimize the effects of the order of exposure.
5.2.3 Measures
The participant response to the game was measured in two different ways: self-reporting
and game logs.
In terms of self-report measures, participants were asked to rate their subjective expe-
rience through simple questionnaires. After each of the eight minute game sessions,
the participants were asked to rate their experience using a 10-point Likert-type scale
(Q1). After both sessions had been completed, the participants were asked to make a
comparison between both team-mates (Q2 & Q3).
Q1: Ranking Enjoyment “How much did you enjoy the game session? (1=I did not
enjoy the game session at all, 10=I enjoyed the game session very much)”
After the participants completed both of the eight minute game sessions, they were
asked to answer two additional questions taking both sessions into consideration. These
questions focused on the participants’ team-mate preferences. The participants were
also asked to provide open-ended feedback to justify their answers.
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Q2: Team-mate Preference Selection “Considering both sessions, which team-mate
would you choose?” (Select one: Computer or Human)”
Q3: Team-mate Preference Rationale “Why would you choose the team-mate se-
lected in the previous question? (Please explain in your own words.)”
In terms of game logs, various game events were logged to a text file during each game
session to track in-game behaviors, which resulted in two text files per participant, one
for each of the two team-mate conditions to allow for later comparisons. These mea-
sured events included the following: highest level achieved, number of deaths (partici-
pant avatar/agent), and number of yell events (participant avatar/agent).
5.3 Results
The main result of this study is that participants overwhelmingly chose the PH team-
mate over the AI team-mate even though the team-mates were in fact the same. The
participants also reported significantly higher levels of enjoyment during the game ses-
sions with the PH team-mate. This suggests that perceived identity is a strong moder-
ator of game enjoyment. In the remainder of this section, these results are presented in
more detail.
5.3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Before examining the differences in the subjective ratings of the participants toward
their team-mates and logged in-game behaviors, statistical analyses were conducted to
rule out any confounding effects of the order of exposure to the AI or PH team-mate.
There were no significant effects of order for any of the dependent measures including
subjective responses and game outcomes. MANOVAs were conducted to detect any
possible effect(s) of demographic variables of age, gender, and experience on all the
dependent measures, and there were no significant interactions or main effects.
5.3.2 Perceived team-mate identity & enjoyment
Q1 explored the effects of team-mate identity on the enjoyment of the game and the
results suggest that playing with the PH team-mate was more enjoyable than the AI
team-mate. Results from a paired-samples T-test showed that when people played with
the PH team-mate, they felt more enjoyment (M=7.48, SD=1.339) than when they
played with the AI team-mate (M=7.10, SD=1.257), t(39)=2.027, p<0.05.
5.3.3 Perceived team-mate identity & preference
Q2 explored the effects of team-mate identity on the preference for team-mate. After
playing both sessions with AI and PH team-mates, the results of the question, “Which
team-mate would you choose?” yielded 70% choosing the human team-mate and 30%
chose the computer team-mate.
Q3 explored the reasons given by the respondents for their choice of team-mate in Q2.
Most comments were simple phrases indicating a key reason for their choice, however,
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the responses were not limited by length and participants were free to mention more
than one reason. Some participants mentioned two or more reasons. Various reasons
were given, which can be grouped into roughly twelve themes related to specific at-
tributes of the team-mate including claims about perceived team-mate characteristics
including: more skillful, more cooperative, flexible, helpful, faster, understanding, intu-
itive, took more risk, and exhibited more predictable behavior as well as claims about
how the team-mate influenced game outcomes including : making the game more fun,
easier to play, and enabled higher achievement.
5.3.4 Effects of identity on game events
Analysis comparing the logged data during both game sessions, revealed that any dif-
ferences in highest level achieved, number of deaths of participant or team-mate, and
number of yell events were not significant.
5.4 Discussion
This section describes how the results of the study inform our understanding of the di-
mension of cooperation that recognizes players derive benefits aside from the achieve-
ment of the explicit game goals. The results revealed differences in enjoyment and
preference for human and computer team-mates.
Further analysis into the reasons for preference revealed similarities and differences in
their reasoning. The results indicate that the belief in the team-mate’s identity influ-
enced the subjective experience of the game. Participants preferred the PH team-mate –
and this preference manifested itself in higher self-reported enjoyment. It is important
to note that the team-mate algorithm was the same for all sessions, thus any differences
were a result of the framing of team-mate identity.
The most simple and straight-forward indicator of the participants treating their ex-
perience with the team-mates differently, is the overwhelming majority of the partic-
ipants (70%) who chose the PH team-mate over the computer team-mate. While this
result from Q2 shows that most participants preferred what they thought was a hu-
man team-mate, it does not show the strength or thoughts behind the preference. The
open-ended feedback yielded various reasons for choosing the team-mate including
team-mate characteristics and influences on game outcomes.
The most frequently given reason for choosing a team-mate was a claim that the skills
of the team-mate were better than the other team-mate. Of the participants who chose
the PH team-mate, 35.7% specifically mentioned that they preferred the team-mate
because it seemed more skillful, while 33% of the participants who chose the AI team-
mate claimed that their selection was due to skill. There were four themes that were
present in support for the PH team-mate that were not mentioned by any of the partic-
ipants who preferred the AI team-mate including claims that the preferred team-mate
was more flexible, helpful, understanding, and exhibited predictable behavior. These
four reasons represented 31.6% of all reasons given by those who preferred the PH
team-mate. This seems to suggest that when players believe their team-mate is a hu-
man, their perception of the team-mate changes to include some of the clearly human
attributes. In terms of reasons related to game outcomes, only participants who chose
the PH team-mate mentioned that the team-mate made the game easier, while this rea-
son was not mentioned by those who preferred the AI team-mate.
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5.4.1 Possible limitations
While the results suggest significant differences in enjoyment and preference, the study
also opens further questions and points to future work that is worth pursuing. The
results suggest that the participants felt social rewards, imagined social attention, and
felt that the cooperation with the presumed human team-mate was more enjoyable.
More in-depth studies could be conducted to examine different contexts, however, this
study begins to reveal differences in the response to human and computer team-mates




In this chapter we present the details of the study examining how participants assigned
credit/blame and assessed player skills when cooperating with human and computer
team-mates. The findings suggest that people assign blame unfairly to computer team-
mates, blaming them more than human team-mates and give more credit to themselves
or their human team-mates. In a similar way, players rated the skills of human team-
mates higher than computer team-mates. Potential problems with the study are also
discussed.
6.1 Motivation
This section situates this study relative to two dimensions of cooperation as noted in
in Chapter 4, that cooperative interactions often include the possibility of assisting
others at a personal cost and the distribution of power is assumed to be equal. These
dimensions open important questions about how people respond to their team-mate
behaviors, how their expectations might differ, and whether the manipulation of team-
mate identity has any effect on the assignment of credit/blame or assessment of skills.
Do people expect more from people or computers? Are behaviors judged equally?
In cooperative games, team-mates expect that their team-mate will work toward the
shared goals of the game. When a player performs an action that moves the team
toward success, usually the team-mates notice and sometimes vocalize with praise and
thanks. When a player is responsible for an event that brings the team closer to defeat,
the team-mates will also notice, but they may vocalize their disapproval in order to
identify problems and make sense of failures so that negative outcomes and problems
can be corrected.
The previous research has not extensively examined the assignment of credit and blame
for human and computer team-mates in cooperative games. On the one hand, studies
suggest that a self-serving bias is more prevalent when interacting with robots [104,
43], yet less common in interactions with virtual office [88] or medical assistants [39].
We conducted a qualitative study to examine how people assigned credit and blame
when playing with different team-mates controlled by a human or computer in a real-
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time cooperative game involving both success and failure events. The power is divided
equally between the team-mates, and players have the option to assist their team-mate
at a personal cost.
6.2 Study Details
This study was focused on identifying differences in the judgmental evaluations of
team-mates related to the assignment of credit for success events and blame for failure
events in the game. Participants were also asked to assess their own skill level and that
of their team-mates. This study was described in [68].
6.2.1 Participants & Materials
A qualitative study was conducted in which 16 participants played variations of a real-
time, goal-oriented, cooperative game with either human or AI team-mates. The par-
ticipants (10 female and 6 male) were undergraduate students between the ages of 19
and 24; all of them had experience playing computer games involving team-mates.
For this study, the Capture the Gunner game that did not include the explicit “draw
fire” signaling was used, however, team-mates could move into the gunner’s FOV to
attract attention from it.
6.2.2 Study Session Protocol
Participants arrived at a private testing room, did not meet any other participants, and
were assured that their comments would be kept anonymous and not revealed to other
human participants. Each participant played the game for 20 minutes, during which
the researcher would pause the game at various times to discuss the progress. This
was followed by 5 minutes of uninterrupted gameplay. The participants were evenly
divided into one of four conditions of gameplay: human with human team-mate (the
team-mate was a confederate researcher in another room); human with presumed hu-
man team-mate (the human team-mate was actually controlled by the computer); hu-
man with AI team-mate; human with presumed AI team-mate (the presumed AI was
actually controlled by a confederate researcher in another room). Participants assigned
to the conditions with a human team-mate were told that their team-mate was another
participant in the study. Participants did not see or communicate with their team-mates.
6.3 Results
The two main findings of this research are that the perception of whether a team-mate
is human or computer results in different credit/blame assignment, with AI team-mates
blamed unfairly – and results in inaccurate skill assessment with the participant as-
sessing their own skill higher than the AI team-mate. Below, these two findings are
discussed along with relevant excerpts from the contextual interviews.
6.3. RESULTS 33
6.3.1 Assigning blame unfairly
The participants who played with a real or presumed AI team-mate were more willing
to assign blame for the failure on the team-mate. Participant 15, who played the game
with the presumed AI team-mate claimed that the team-mate was equally responsible
for losses of the team even though the team-mate was able to avoid the shots from the
gunner more often than the participant. The participant explained the assessment by
acknowledging that it was unfair, but that it was permissible because the team-mate
was AI:
Researcher: So even though you seemed to take most of the hits from the
gunner, you believe that the blame should be shared equally?
Participant 15: Well, I think because it is AI, it doesn’t matter, but if it was
a friend then I would say that I am more at fault for losing.
Essentially, the participant made a claim that since the team-mate was AI, a person
should not feel bad about being unfair in credit assignment. However, when the team-
mate was human, or presumed to be, the participants again made very polite statements
with toned down attribution of blame towards the team-mate. For example, Participant
10, explained the losses caused by the human team-mate:
Researcher: Who is most responsible for the losses of the team?
Participant 10: I would not blame him but would expect him to know it’s
because of his error.
Participant 7, who played with the presumed human team-mate was extremely gener-
ous and searching for other reasons aside from blaming the team-mate:
Participant 7: It so happened that the thing [gunner] keeps going after him
. . .
Researcher: So you feel like he’s unfairly targeted?
Participant 7: Yeah . . . um . . . I can’t say ‘you are terrible’ because I have
not experienced it. If I were to condemn him, next time if it targeted me, I
may go,‘oh crap!’ and run into the bullet
There were many similar examples in which the participants readily assigned blame
to the AI team-mate, yet there were no examples in which the participant was willing
to take undue credit for the successes of the team. This was true for all conditions
including the human and AI teams as well as the human-human teams.
6.3.2 Inaccurate skill assessment
The study also suggests that participants who played with a real or presumed AI team-
mate made inaccurate comparative skill assessments. One of the most vivid examples
of this was in a session in which Participant 15 sustained 7 hits from the gunner and
the team-mate had not been hit at all, yet the participant continually claimed that their
level of skill was equivalent. The researcher asked how the participant would assess
the team-mates’ skill levels.
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Researcher: How would you assess the skills of the team-mate compared
to your own?
Participant 15: I would say we are at the same level.
Researcher: Even though the team-mate hasn’t been hit?
Participant 15: I think this time, he could have been faster at making the
second touch and then I wouldn’t have been shot. The last round, he should
have drawn fire for me.
When participants played with a real or presumed human team-mate, the participants
were more accurate in their comparative assessments – but the way in which they dis-
cussed the issue highlighted a distinction between performance and skill that the other
participants did not. Specifically, whenever participants in this category noted that they
were performing better than their team-mates, they went to great lengths to rational-
ize their team-mates performance. For example, participants 5 and 7 both played the
condition with a presumed human team-mate and they were not only hesitant to crit-
icize the skills of their team-mate, but they both invented technical reasons why their
team-mate did not perform well. Participant 5 mentioned that there may be network
glitches and Participant 7 explained that there must have been a lag between what the
team-mate wanted to do and what the avatar was doing.
6.4 Implications
The results of the study suggest that players assign credit and blame unfairly, blaming
the computer team-mate more than human team-mates including themselves. When as-
signing blame and credit with a human team-mate, participants were far more positive
and made excuses for failure events involving their team-mate. The results also suggest
that players make a fundamental attribution error when assigning credit and blame –
when computers are involved in failure events, they are directly blamed, however when
human team-mates are involved in failure events, the participants frequently blamed
external causes (luck, game opponent unfairly targeted them).
6.4.1 Possible limitations
While the results suggest significant differences in credit and blame assignment as
well as differences in skill assessment for human and computer team-mates, the study
involved a very simple game that might not generalize to more complex situations.
While it would be interesting to conduct further research on other cooperative games
with more complexity, the game used for this study engaged people in a real-time




In this chapter we present the details of the study examining how participants make
judgmental evaluations, rating the amount of cooperation of team-mates and the amount
of risks they take on behalf of the participant. Participants rated human team-mates
higher in terms of cooperation and amount of risks taken on their behalf compared to
computer team-mates. Potential problems with the study are also discussed.
7.1 Motivation
This section situates this study relative to two dimensions of cooperation as noted in
in Chapter 4, that team-mates share a common goal and cooperative interactions often
include the possibility of assisting others at a personal cost. In terms of the common
goal, this study examines to what extent the manipulation of team-mate identity effects
how players rate the level of cooperation from their team-mate toward the shared goal.
This study also examines the effects of team-mate identity on how players rate the
amount of risk-taking by the team-mate on their behalf. Do people notice cooperative
behaviors differently? Do people recognize the risk-taking efforts of their team-mates
equally regardless of whether the assistance comes from a computer or human team-
mate?
In order to study these questions, a quantitative study was conducted in which partic-
ipants played a real-time, goal-oriented, cooperative game that allows (but does not
require) players to perform risky actions that benefit their team-mates – specifically,
player’s can “draw gunfire” towards themselves (and away from their team-mates).
During the study, all participants played the game twice: once with an AI team-mate
and once with a “presumed” human team-mate (i.e., an AI team-mate that they believed
was a human team-mate). Thus, the team-mate performance and behaviors were iden-
tical for both cases – and in both cases, the team-mate “drew gunfire” an equal amount
of the time. Participants answered questions about the game as well as the cooperative
and risk-taking behaviors of their team-mates. The study is now described in more
detail.
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7.2 Study Details
This study was focused on identifying differences in the perception of cooperation and
risk-taking by presumed human and computer team-mates and was described in [67].
7.2.1 Participants & Materials
The 40 participants who took part in the study included 26 female and 14 male students
between the ages of 20 and 25 with an average age of 21.7 years. Participants were
briefed on the concept of cooperative game play and were asked to fill out a small
questionnaire and consent form. When asked to rate their experience and skill level
with interactive digital games, the results were fairly evenly distributed: 10% claimed
to be novice, 25% claimed to have little experience (less than average), 45% claimed to
have average experience, 12.5% claimed to havemuch experience (more than average),
and 7.5% claimed to be expert.
For this study, the version of the Capture the Gunner (CTG) game that included the
explicit “draw fire” signaling through the keyboard activated “yell” feature was used as
previously described.
7.2.2 Study Session Protocol
Participants arrived at a private testing room, did not meet any other participants, and
were assured that their comments would be kept anonymous and not revealed to other
participants. Each participant was briefed on the game, read a description of the game
objectives and explanation of the “yell” feature, which was identified as an additional
way of attracting attention of the gunner by taking on additional risk. The participants
then watched a short video illustrating the game and the “yell” feature. Participants
then played the game for three sessions. The first session was to familiarize the partic-
ipants with the game. This was followed by two sessions of eight minutes each, one
with an AI team-mate and another with a PH (“presumed human”) team-mate. The
order of these sessions was alternated for each study to minimize the effects of the
order of exposure. The PH team-mate was actually controlled by the computer using
the same AI algorithm in both sessions, yet the participants were told that there was a
human participant who joined through the network controlling the team-mate.
7.2.3 Measures
The participant response to the game was measured in two different ways: self-reporting
and game logs.
In terms of self-report measures, participants were asked to rate their subjective experi-
ence through simple questionnaires. After each of the eight minute game sessions, the
participants were asked to rate their experience using a 10-point scale (Q1, Q3). After
both sessions had been completed, the participants were asked to make a comparison
between both team-mates (Q2).
Q1: Ranking Risk “How much risk did your team-mate take to help you? (1=Team-
mate did not take any risks to help me, 10=Team-mate took many risks to help
me)”
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After the participants had played with both team-mates, they were asked to re-
flect on both sessions and then evaluate which team-mate took more risks to help
them using a 10 point scale (1-5 favoring the human team-mate / 6-10 favoring
the computer team-mate)
Q2: Comparative Risk “Which team-mate took more risks trying to help you? (1=Hu-
man team-mate took more risks to help me, 10=Computer team-mate took more
risks to help me)”
Q3: Cooperation “How well did your team-mate cooperate with you? (1=Team-mate
did not cooperate very well at all, 10=Team-mate cooperated very well)”
Q3 focused on the perceived level of cooperation, to ensure that the game feels
like a cooperative experience and to note any wide differences across the two
team-mate conditions.
Game event measures
Various game events were logged to a text file during each game session to track in
game behaviors, which resulted in two text files per participant, one for each of the two
team-mate conditions to allow for later comparisons. These measured events included
the following: highest level achieved, number of deaths (participant avatar/agent),
number of yell events (participant avatar/agent). The game interface used by the par-
ticipants indicated the current level, however, the other game statistics were not visible
to them to avoid these from possibly influencing the perceptions of their team-mate.
7.3 Results
The main results of this study are that when participants played with the PH team-mate,
they perceived significantly greater amount of risk taken by the team-mate to help them
than when they played with the AI team-mate. Participants also claimed significantly
higher levels of cooperation with the PH team-mate compared to the AI team-mate.
7.3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Before we examined differences in the subjective ratings of the participants toward
their team-mates and logged in-game behaviors, statistical analyses were conducted to
rule out any confounding effects of the order of exposure to the AI or PH team-mate.
There were no significant effects of order for any of the dependent measures including
subjective responses and game outcomes. MANOVAs were conducted to detect any
possible effect(s) of demographic variables of age, gender, and experience on all the
dependent measures, and there were no significant interactions or main effects.
7.3.2 Effects of team-mate identity on perception of risk
Q1 explored the effects of team-mate identity on the perception of risk-taking by a
team-mate to help the player. Considering the strong significance of the higher reported
level of cooperation in Q3, a paired-sample T-test was conducted with the expectation
that a higher level of perceived risk would be present with the PH team-mate. The
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one-tailed test revealed that when participants played with the PH team-mate, they
perceived significantly greater amount of risk taken by the team-mate to help them
than when they played with the AI team-mate p=0.029.
Q2 further explored the effects of team-mate identity on the perception of risk taken by
a team-mate to help the player. When asked to consider both team-mates and compare
the amount of risk taken by each to help the participant, 67.5% chose values indicating
that the PH took more risks, while 32.5% chose values indication that the AI took more
risks.
7.3.3 Effects of team-mate identity on perception of cooperation
The results of Q3 provided insights into the difference in perception of the two team-
mate conditions and gave reason to expect that participants would report higher levels
of risk-taking by their human team-mates in Q1.
Q3 explored the effects of team-mate identity on the perception of cooperation from
the team-mate. Results from a paired-sample T-test revealed that when people played
with the PH team-mate, they felt significantly greater cooperation in the game than
when they played with the AI team-mate p=0.005.
7.3.4 Logged game events
The results of the logged data show that the differences in highest levels achieved,
number of player or team-mate deaths, and the number of risk-taking signaling actions
were non-significant as shown in Table 7.3.4.
Paired samples T-tests were used to compare the logged data during both game ses-
sions, which revealed that any differences in highest level achieved, number of deaths
of participant or team-mate, and number of yell events were non-significant. This con-
firms that the events and behaviors were generally consistent across the sessions and
that there was no measurable benefit from having one team-mate vs. another.
7.4 Discussion
This section describes how the results of the study inform the dimensions of coopera-
tion, specifically that team-mates expect and attend to the amount of cooperation from
their team-mate toward shared goals and the perception of receiving assistance from
others at a cost to the giver. The results revealed differences in the perceived levels
of cooperation and amount of risk-taking by human and computer team-mates, with
team-mates framed as “human” being rated significantly higher in both regards.
The results suggest that the belief about team-mate identity can influence the subjective
experience of playing cooperative games with AI or human team-mates. Considering
that the team-mate algorithm was the same in both conditions, the results of this study
suggest that the player “attends more” to the cooperative behavior and acts of risk-
taking when the team-mate identity is framed as “human.” The results also suggest
that players are less likely to notice cooperative behaviors of a team-mate framed as
“AI” or, perhaps, they may be less willing to label these behaviors as cooperative.
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Logged game event Mean SD Diff. t df p
Highest level achieved
with PH team-mate




Deaths of player avatar
with PH team-mae
9.20 3.838 -0.150 -0.282 39 0.779









“yell” events by player
avatar with PH team-
mate
18.05 39.082 1.275 0.296 39 0.769
“yell” events by player
avatar with AI team-
mate
16.77 21.526
“yell” events by team-
mate with PH team-mate
25.20 7.068 -0.425 -0.303 39 0.764
“yell” events by team-
mate with AI team-mate
25.63 8.151
Table 7.1: Table of means of logged game events showing the non-significant differ-
ences between game sessions with PH and AI team-mates.
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7.4.1 Possible limitations
There is one particular issue that is worth discussing in more detail. There was a large
difference in the standard deviation of the participant signaling behavior in the game,
yet the difference between the average signaling with human and computer team-mates
was non-significant. This raises the concern that the signaling mechanism was not un-
derstood or able to be used easily by the participants. The logged data shows that
the signaling frequency was erratic. Although this odd result does not affect the main
findings reported in this study, to address this concern, however, in the chapter describ-
ing the protection study (Chapter 8), participants were trained more thoroughly and




In this chapter we present the details of the study examining the differences in pro-
tective behavior toward human and computer team-mates in a real-time cooperative
game. Participants performed significantly more protective actions for their computer
team-mates compared to their human team-mates, however, the participants claimed
the opposite.
8.1 Motivation
This section situates this study relative to two dimensions of cooperation as noted in
in Chapter 4, that team-mates share a common goal and cooperative interactions of-
ten include the possibility of assisting others at a personal cost. Whereas the previous
studies examined the perception of cooperation and risk-taking, this study focused on
player behavior in terms of protective actions toward their team-mates and examines
how the manipulation of team-mate identity effects these behaviors. Orienting toward
the shared goal, do people protect human or computer team-mates equally? Do peo-
ple recognize their own behaviors regarding protective actions equally regardless of
whether they are protecting a computer or human team-mate?
In order to study these questions, a quantitative study was conducted in which par-
ticipants played a real-time, goal-oriented, cooperative game that allows (but does
not require) players to perform risky protective actions that benefit their team-mates
– specifically, player’s can “draw gunfire” towards themselves (and away from their
team-mates). Participants answered questions about the game and about their own
behaviors. Additional questions explored interpretations of team-mate behaviors and
stereotypes about team-mates. The study is now described in more detail.
8.2 Study Details
This study was focused on identifying differences in the protective behavior toward
presumed human and computer team-mates. Some of the statistical results are pre-
sented in short form, however key details of the study are now presented. Full details
of this study are described in [66].
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8.2.1 Participants & Materials
The 32 participants who took part in the study included 23 female and 9 male students
between the ages of 19 and 24 with an average age of 20.7 years. Participants were
briefed on the concept of cooperative game play and were asked to fill out a small
questionnaire and consent form. When asked to rate their experience and skill level
with interactive digital games, the results were fairly evenly distributed: 9.4% claimed
to be novice, 25% claimed to have little experience (less than average), 50% claimed to
have average experience, 15.6% claimed to havemuch experience (more than average),
and no participants claimed to be expert.
For this study, the version of the Capture the Gunner game that included the explicit
“draw fire” signaling through the keyboard activated “yell” feature was used as previ-
ously described.
8.2.2 Study Session Protocol
Participants arrived at a private testing room, did not meet any other participants, and
were assured that their comments would be kept anonymous and not revealed to other
participants. Each participant was briefed on the game, read a description of the game
objectives and explanation of the “yell” feature, which was identified as an explicit way
of attracting attention of the gunner to protect their team-mate. The participants then
watched a short video twice, once with an explanation of how the gunner is captured
and then another viewing of the video was accompanied with more attention to the
“yell” events that occurred at various times in the video. In order to avoid confusion
and to ensure the participants were comfortable and proficient with drawing fire, during
the practice session, the participants were guided through pressing the “W” key during
two levels of the game.
Participants played the game for two sessions of five minutes each, once with an AI
team-mate and again with a “presumed human” (PH) team-mate; the order was ran-
domized. At the start of each session, the researcher reminded the participant that they
could press the “W” key if they desired and the researcher motioned to the “W” on the
keyboard and ensured that the participant placed their finger on the key to be ready to
press the key during the game session if desired.
The PH team-mate was actually controlled by the computer using the same AI algo-
rithm in both sessions, yet the participants were told that there was a human participant
who joined through the network controlling the team-mate.
8.2.3 Measures
The participant response to the game was measured in two different ways: logged game
events and self-reporting.
Various game events were recorded in a text file during each game session to track
in-game behaviors including the logging of the yell events, to capture the intentional
protective attempts by players to draw fire for their team-mates.
In terms of self-report measures, questionnaires were answered after each session, and
after both sessions were complete, additional forced-selection, Likert-type scale, and
open-ended questions were answered comparing the two game sessions. Additional
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questions focused on the participants’ beliefs, stereotypes, and experiences with human
and AI team-mates in their past. Questions also focused on opinions about interactions
between team-mates viewed in short video clips involving team-mates. These questions
are now described.
Q1: Self Evaluation of Protective Behaviors “Which team-mate did you protect the
most? (Human / AI) Why?” (answered after both sessions were complete)
Q2-4: Stereotypes In order to explore the preconceived opinions, stereotypes, and be-
liefs about human and AI team-mates, three 5-point Likert-type scale questions
focused on the degree to which the participant would agree with statements about
typical behaviors and characteristics of a team-mate. The three questions were
posed about human as well as AI team-mates resulting in six questions in total,
which are as follows:
• Q2: (Human/AI) team-mates can adapt according to the situation.
• Q3: (Human/AI) team-mates are helpful.
• Q4: (Human/AI) team-mates are very understanding.
These questions focused on the stereotypes held by the participants and were
posed to the participants after all games had been played and after they were
asked to make judgments about their protective behaviors in the game to ensure
that the behaviors and thoughts about the behaviors would not be affected.
Q5: Personal Pressures In order to explore the social pressures related to playing
games with human and AI team-mates, a 5-point Likert-type scale question asked
the participants how much they agree with the statement about the pressures to
act in the game. The question was posed about human as well as AI team-mates
resulting in two questions in total.
• Q5: With a (Human/AI) team-mate I feel pressure to try as hard as I can to
win.
Q6-11: Explaining Observed Behaviors In order to explore differences in how play-
ers interpret the behavior of AI and human team-mates, participants were asked
to watch six short video clips of the game being played, after each video, they
were asked to explain in their own words, what one of the team-mates was trying
to do. In three of the videos, the participant was told that both team-mates were
controlled by human players and they were instructed to focus on one player
identified by the researcher. The other three videos were copies of the first three
videos, however, the participants were told that one of the team-mates was a hu-
man and one was an AI team-mate. The participants were told they should focus
on the AI team-mate. Participants were permitted to watch the video clips more
than once if desired. The content of the videos are briefly described:
• Q6 (PH) & Q9 (AI): Team-mate of focus touched the gunner, then pro-
ceeded to activate “yell” events continuously until the other team-mate
completed the second touch. This was intended to demonstrate a deliberate
attempt to protect the team-mate.
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• Q7 (PH) & 10 (AI): Team-mate of focus touched the gunner, then passed
through the field of view without signaling. This was intended to demon-
strate a more ambiguous attempt to protect the team-mate.
• Q8 (PH) & 11 (AI): Team-mate of focus touched the gunner, then avoided
the field of view for the remainder of the video. This was intended to
demonstrate a deliberate attempt to avoid protecting the team-mate and to
avoid the gunner.
8.3 Results
The main result of this study is that participants engaged in more protective signaling
events for their AI team-mates compared to the “presumed human” team-mate. This
stands in contrast to the self-reported feedback in which the participants claimed to
have protected the PH team-mate the most.
Additional self-reported feedback indicates various stereotypes, feelings, and attitudes
toward human and AI team-mates with more emotional descriptions of intention for
human team-mates and AI team-mates being judged more critically.
8.3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Before examining the differences in the subjective ratings of the participants toward
their team-mates and logged in-game behaviors, statistical analyses were conducted to
rule out any confounding effects of the order of exposure to the AI or PH team-mate.
There were no significant effects of order for any of the dependent measures including
subjective responses and game outcomes. MANOVAs were conducted to detect any
possible effects of demographic variables of age, gender, and experience on all the
dependent measures, and there were no significant interactions or main effects.
8.3.2 Logged Data
Paired samples T-tests were used to compare the logged data during both game ses-
sions. Among the logged data, there was a statistically significant difference in the
number of times the player “yelled” when playing with the AI and human team-mates,
with the participants signaling more to protect their AI team-mates than they did for hu-
man team-mates. Various data were shown to have statistically significant correlations,
which provides additional insights into the player behaviors.
The results from a paired-sample T-test revealed that when people played with the AI
team-mate, they drew fire more in the game than when they played with the PH team-
mate (p<0.05).
Paired samples T-tests were used to compare the other logged data during both game
sessions, which revealed that any differences in highest level achieved, number of times
the participant touched the gunner before the team-mate, and the number of deaths
of participant or team-mate were all non-significant as shown in Table 8.3.2. This
confirms that the AI performed in an equivalent manner for all sessions.
Further analysis of the logged data suggests that behaviors of signaling by the par-
ticipant in the PH condition is positively correlated with team-mate signaling, r(30) =
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Logged game event Mean SD Diff. t df p
Highest level achieved
with PH team-mate




# of 1st touch events
by participant with PH
team-mate
10.25 3.724 -0.344 -0.550 31 0.586
# of 1st touch events by
participant with AI team-
mate
10.59 3.387
# of 1st touch events by
PH team-mate
17.13 5.621 -0.156 -0.166 31 0.869




avatar with PH team-mae
6.75 2.489 -0.094 -0.225 31 0.824
Deaths of participant
avatar with AI team-
mate
6.84 2.737
Deaths of PH team-mate 0.53 0.671 -0.094 0.682 31 0.500
Deaths of AI team-mate .44 0.619
“yell” events by partici-
pant with PH team-mate
9.88 9.648 -3.344 -2.236 31 0.033
“yell” events by partici-
pant with AI team-mate
13.22 10.983
“yell” events by PH
team-mate
17.06 4.819 -1.188 -1.574 31 0.126
“yell” events by AI team-
mate
18.25 4.593
Table 8.1: Table of means of logged game events showing the differences between
game sessions with PH and AI team-mates.
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.467,p<.01. This means that when playing with the PH team-mate, participants usually
mirror the team-mate signaling behavior.
8.3.3 Self-evaluation of protective behavior
Q1 explored the effects of team-mate identity on the perception of the amount the team-
mate protected their team-mates. A large majority of participants (71%) indicated that
they protected the presumed human team-mate more than the AI team-mate.
A review of the open-ended feedback explaining their selections provides additional
insights into the priorities and concerns participants had for their team-mates. Those
who claimed they protected the presumed human the most provided explanations that
can be grouped into four common explanations. The most commonly stated reason
(36.4%) involved claims that their team-mate needed more protection. 22.7% claimed
that the ease of providing protection to the presumed human team-mate guided their
actions. Another 22.7% noted that they protected the presumed human more out of a
sense of obligation or duty, and the remaining 18.2% claimed that they protected the
presumed human more due to a sense of empathy with their team-mate.
In contrast, those who claimed that they protected the AI team-mate more gave only
one of two reasons why they protected the AI team-mate more, which focused on either
the perceived needs of the team-mate (55%) or the ease of offering protection (33%) to
the team-mate. One participant (12%) did not provide a reason for their selection.
8.3.4 Stereotypes
Q2-4 explored the opinions and stereotypes participants have for human and AI team-
mates. Participants rated humans more favorably in various dimensions. The items that
resulted in statistically significant differences are now presented:
Q2 asked the participants to rate their belief in team-mates adapting according to the
situation. The results suggest that participants believe more strongly that human team-
mates can adapt according to the situation than an AI team-mate. Results from a paired-
samples T-test showed that the difference was statistically significant (p<0.001).
Q3 asked the participants to rate their belief in helpfulness of team-mates. The results
suggest that participants believe more strongly that human team-mates are more helpful
than an AI team-mate. Results from a paired-samples T-test showed that the difference
was statistically significant (p<0.01).
Q4 asked the participants to rate their belief in how understanding team-mates are, with
results that suggest participants believe more strongly that human team-mates are more
understanding than an AI team-mates. Results from a paired-samples T-test showed
that the difference was statistically significant (p<0.01).
8.3.5 Personal pressures
Q5 asked the participants to rate the pressure they feel to try as hard as they can to
win the game with human and AI team-mates. The results suggest that participants
feel more pressure to try as hard as they can to win when playing with a human team-
mate than with an AI team-mate. Results from a paired-samples T-test showed that the
difference was statistically significant (p<0.001).
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8.3.6 Observed behaviors
Q6-11 explored how the identity of the team-mate results in differences in evaluations
of observed behaviors. The explanations given for the presumed human team-mate
usually involved positive evaluations, offering more than one possible explanation, and
reflected beliefs that the team-mate brings emotion, thought, and intention to their ac-
tions. The explanations given for the equivalent behaviors when participants thought
they were AI team-mates were much more simple, critical, and were often more con-
demning of the team-mates actions. The results for the three videos are described in
more detail in [66].
8.4 Discussion
This section describes how the results of the study inform our understanding of the
dimensions of cooperation that team-mates actively contribute toward the shared goals
of the game and the perception of giving assistance to others at a personal cost to them-
selves. The results revealed differences in the protective actions toward human and
computer team-mates, with team-mates framed as “human” being protected signifi-
cantly less, however players claimed the opposite.
Considering the difference in behavior and the self-reported measures, the difference
in the participants’ protective behaviors and the incongruent claim about their behavior
leads to two plausible explanations. 1) participants relied on stereotypes and attended
to the greater expected need for protection that is characteristic of AI team-mates, pro-
tecting them more, 2) when actually performing the protective acts, the participants
attended more to aspects of fairness involved in their altruistic actions resulting in a
mirroring of the actions of presumed human team-mate (tit for tat), yet with the AI
team-mate, the participant engaged in protective acts quantitatively more because they
were not concerned with the level of reciprocity from their team-mate. Instead, they
tried to protect the team-mate as much as they could, resulting in more protective acts.
In reflection, when participants considered how much they protected their team-mates,
they claimed to have protected the human team-mates more than the AI team-mates
because the protective acts performed for the presumed human team-mate were likely
more memorable and therefore, seemed like quantitatively more.
8.4.1 Possible limitations
There are several aspects of this study that present possible limitations that should be
discussed and evaluated. These include a possible reconstruction bias and the breadth
and granularity of logged data. We now discuss how these might affect the validity of
the contribution.
The logged data could have been more extensive in order to capture more of the player
styles and strategies. Capturing more data points requires additional analysis that does
not always yield useful information. For example, the time spent in gunner’s field of
view was not captured, however, its usefulness is questionable. Capturing the intention
from this data point is not possible because in the times that participants are fleeing the
gunner, their intentions are to protect themselves, and not to protect their team-mate,
yet they might still be in the FOV as they flee. The logged game events were chosen
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and refined over time to provide the most clear insights into the intentions and actions
of the participants, and to avoid confusing or useless data.
There is also the possibility that participants responded with a reconstruction bias.
Since the participants played the game for two sessions of five minutes, with ques-
tions following the game play, it is possible that the participants were at a loss when
trying to remember how many protective acts they took for each team-mate and there-
fore, reflected upon what they thought they “should have” done in the game. This is
difficult to rule out, and measure, however, as part of this study, participants watched
short video clips that were approximately 10-15 seconds in length and were asked to
provide a description of what the team-mates were doing. The participants provided
their answers immediately after watching each clip. The resulting descriptions were
consistent with the differences in perception of human and computer team-mates in
previous questions and provides evidence against the reconstruction bias.
Chapter 9
Sacrificing Team-mates
In this chapter we present the details of the study examining the differences in how
participants choose to sacrifice their human and computer team-mates for the sake of
the team goals in a cooperative game. Participants sacrificed their computer team-mates
significantly more than their human team-mates.
9.1 Motivation
This section situates the study within a dimension of cooperation as noted in in Chap-
ter 4, that team-mates share a common goal and cooperative interactions often include
the possibility of assisting others at a personal cost. While the previous chapter de-
scribed a study in which the distribution of power was equally shared, this study pushes
the balance in favor of the human player and forces the human to decide whether or not
to place their team-mate into a sacrificial position in order to further the team goals.
This study focused on the player behavior in terms of decisions to sacrifice their team-
mates and examines how the manipulation of team-mate identity effects these behav-
iors.
In order to study this, a quantitative study was conducted in which participants played
a real-time, cooperative game that requires players to decide whether to sacrifice or
protect their team-mates. The study is now described in more detail.
9.2 Study details
This study was focused on identifying differences in the decision-making related to
sacrificing human or computer team-mates in order to achieve the goals in the game.
This study was described in a separate paper (submitted for review), however key de-
tails of the study are now presented.
9.2.1 Participants & Materials
The 38 participants who took part in the study included 7 male and 31 female students
between the ages of 19 and 23 with an average age of 20.9 years. Participants self-
reported their experience with interactive digital games, with 18.4% indicating ‘very
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little’, 13.2% ‘little’, 60.5% ‘some’, and 7.9% indicated ‘much’. When asked to rate
their experience with computers, 39% rated themselves as having ‘some experience’
and 61% rated themselves as having ‘much experience’.
The study used the cooperative game previously described called “Defend the Pass”
(DTP). The objective of the game is for both team-mates to cooperate and kill an army
of 30 monsters that is trying to escape through a pass that the players are defending.
9.2.2 Study Session Protocol
This section describes the study protocol followed for this study. Participants arrived at
a private testing room, did not meet other participants, and assured that their comments
would be kept anonymous and not revealed to other participants. Participants began by
reading a tutorial about the DTP game, then proceeded to play a tutorial four times, and
were instructed to position their team-mate in both the sacrifice and protected positions
twice each. The tutorial was played with a computer team-mate named “TUTORIAL-
AI”. This provided the opportunity for the researcher to explain the advantages of plac-
ing the team-mate in the sacrifice position (more likely to achieve the team goals at the
expense of the team-mate survival) and the protected position (less likely to achieve
the team goals, but more likely to save the team-mate from getting hit). After the tuto-
rial, they played 2 rounds of 5 games each, once with a computer team-mate and once
with a team-mate identified as a human joining through the network, and answered
questions after each round. The order of exposure to the team-mates was balanced and
randomized. Before each of the 10 games, the screen was frozen for 8 seconds, which
was explained to the participants as time they are given to think about where to place
their team-mate. To counter possible influences of team-mate gender, display names of
the same gender were matched to the participant gender.
9.2.3 Measures
The participant response to the game was measured in two different ways: logged game
events and self-reporting.
In terms of logged game data, various events were recorded in a text file during each
game session to track in-game behaviors of each participant. For each game played,
the logs detailed which position the team-mate was placed, number of monsters that
escaped, the amount of ammunition used by the participant and team-mate, and the
amount of time taken by participants to choose their team-mates position.
In terms of self-report measures, questionnaires were answered after each session, and
after both sessions were complete, additional forced selection, Likert-type scale, and
open-ended questions were answered comparing the two game sessions. These ques-
tions are now described.
After each round of 5 games, participants answered a questionnaire, which asked the
participants to indicate their opinions about the game.
Team-mate considerations In order to explore the motivation and rationale behind
the player actions, 5-point Likert-type and 10-point scale questions asked the
team-mate how much they considered their team-mate.
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• Q1: I considered the survival of my (Human/AI) team-mate when selecting
my team-mate’s position. [1=I strongly disagree, 5=I strongly agree]
• Q2: How emotionally difficult was it to decide where to position your team-
mate? [1=not difficult at all, 10=Very difficult]
Team-mate comparisons In order to explore the motivation and rationale behind the
player actions, open-ended questions asked the team-mate how much they con-
sidered their team-mate.
• Q3: What were you thinking about during those 8 seconds before you were
allowed to select the position of your teammate?
• Q4: Did you think about different things when you had a human or com-
puter teammate? Please explain.
• Q5: Did you employ different strategies with your teammates? Please ex-
plain.
Thought Experiment The researcher asked participants a series of questions where
they were told to imagine different hypothetical outcomes of the game and how
they felt about them.
• Q6: Which result deserves the most praise? (place the following game
results in order with 1 being the result that deserves the most praise to 8
being the result that deserves the least praise:
– PH teammate not sacrificed team win
– AI teammate not sacrificed team win
– PH teammate sacrificed team win
– AI teammate sacrificed team win
– PH teammate not sacrificed team lose
– AI teammate not sacrificed team lose
– AI teammate sacrificed team lose
– PH teammate sacrificed team lose
9.3 Results
The main result of this study is that the framing of team-mate identity affected the par-
ticipants’ decisions to protect their team-mates. Participants sacrificed the AI team-
mates significantly more than team-mates framed as human. Evidence from self-
reported feedback provides further support and reveals some of the rationale and moti-
vation for player actions.
9.3.1 Preliminary analysis
To ensure there were no confounding effects of the order of exposure to the PH or AI
teammate, MANOVAs were conducted, and it was found that there were no significant
effects of gender of the participants or the order of team-mates on any of the dependent
measures in the logged data and self-reported questionnaires.
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9.3.2 Logged Data
The results from the logged game data suggests that players sacrificed the AI team-
mate more than the PH team-mate. Analysis of the logged data from both rounds of the
game revealed that any differences in the number of bullets used, number of monsters
escaped, amount of time to decide where to position the team-mate, and time taken for
the teammate to die were non significant.
In terms of choices to sacrifice team-mates, results showed that across all 5 games
played in a round with each type of teammate, participants protected their PH teammate
more than their AI teammate. A paired-sample T-test found that when playing with the
PH teammate, participants protected their teammate significantly more often (M=0.36,
sd=0.22) than their AI teammate (M=0.23, sd=0.21), t (37)=2.78, p<0.01).
When comparing the decisions to sacrifice over the 5 games in both rounds, the re-
sults suggest that the perceived identity of the teammate as well as the order in which
they played with the team-mates impacted the decisions as shown in Figure 11.5. The
trendlines also show that for both types of teammates and regardless of order that the
teammates are played, there is a tendency for participants to protect their teammates
less as the round goes on.
Figure 9.1: Summary table indicating on the Y axis, the number participants placing
the team-mate in the protected position for each game of the 5-game rounds
9.3.3 Self reported data
Q1 asked if participants they considered the survival of their team-mate when making
their decisions. Participants rated their consideration for the PH teammates survival
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higher (M=3.00, sd=1.09) than for their AI teammate (M=2.50, sd=1.01). A paired-
samples T-test showed this difference to be significant t (37)=2.391, p<0.05).
Q2 asked how emotionally difficult it was to decide whether or not to sacrifice the
team-mate. Participants rated the emotional difficulty for deciding their PH teammates
position higher (M=4.39, sd=2.42) than for their AI teammate (M=2.05, sd=1.68). A
paired-samples T-test showed this difference to be significant t (37)=4.845, p<0.01).
Q3-5 asked for open-ended feedback regarding the players’ thoughts and strategies
employed during game play. In summary, there were more statements showing em-
pathy and concern for the human team-mates, whereas statements related to the AI
team-mates were mostly focused on outcomes (e.g. score, achievement, etc.)
Q6 asked the participants to rank the 8 possible outcomes of the game in order of the
amount of praise each deserved. As shown in table 9.1 The outcome (winning over
losing), followed by the action (protecting valued over sacrificing), and finally identity
(human over AI).
Type of Result Average Rank Most Frequently
Ranked
Human teammate not sacrificed, team win 1 (7.868) 1 (35)
AI teammate not sacrificed, team win 2 (6.394) 2 (22)
AI teammate sacrificed, team win 3 (5.263 ) 3 (13)
Human teammate sacrificed, team win 4 (5.131) 4 (15)
Human teammate not sacrificed, team lose 5 (4.342) 5 (18)
AI teammate not sacrificed, team lose 6 (3.00) 6 (17)
AI teammate sacrificed, team lose 7 (2.052) 7 (24)
Human teammate sacrificed, team lose 8 (1.947) 8 (23)
Table 9.1: Ranking of game outcomes according to which deserves the most praise
In the ranking exercise for the eight possible results, each rank was assigned a specific
value – eight points for the highest rank down to one point for the lowest rank. The
most frequent rating was also matched to the average ranking, which suggests that most
participants used very similar rationale and motivation for deciding the priorities of the
game outcomes.
9.4 Discussion
This section describes how the results of the study inform our understanding of the
dimension of cooperation related to the distribution of control. While in the previous
study on protection placed team-mates in a game with equal distribution of power,
this study placed more control in the hands of the human player and forced them to
decide the fate of their team-mates. The results revealed differences in the decisions
to sacrifice human and computer team-mates, with team-mates framed as “computer-
controlled” sacrificed significantly more than team-mates whose identity was framed
as “human.”
The results suggest that the belief about team-mate identity can influence the actual co-
operative behaviors with AI or human team-mates. Participants seemed to feel personal
obligations and social motivations to resist sacrificing the human team-mate, however,
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this obligation did not override the desire to achieve the team-goals. As players became
familiar with the game and realized the necessity of sacrificing the human team-mate,
they did so. This suggests that the power of social obligations may be transient in the
artificial realm of the game world. This suggests that the “magic circle,” [86] in some
ways removes the pressure to protect others, perhaps because it occurs to the player
that they are in fact free to explore and push the boundaries of social rules within the
safe zone of the game world.
9.4.1 Limitations
The fact that the game was overly simple could be considered a possible limitation in
this study. While the game was very simple, it provided a mechanism and an activity
around which players could be placed in a game situation and decide whether or not
to sacrifice their team-mate. Although this game might not be as engaging as typical
popular games, it provided a game-like context that was consistent across each study.
Chapter 10
Explanatory Framework
In this chapter, we discuss goals for an explanatory framework that can be used to make
sense of the phenomena revealed in the user studies described previously. We propose
that a framework should address expectations of the team-mate, self directed concerns,
social motivations, and should discuss how the team-mate experience unfolds over
time. We then propose an original framework, the Cooperative Attribution Framework
(CAF), based on the concept of schemas, which is proposed as a tool that explains
the differences in emotional and judgmental evaluations of human and computer team-
mates in cooperative games. Different schemas are adopted by the participants before
each session, ordering their thoughts and setting their expectations for the cooperative
experience. We describe the use of the framework elements as components in a process
cycle in which the human player continually adjusts their expectations of the their team-
mate during gameplay.
Taking a step back from the results of the studies detailed in previous chapters, it be-
comes clear that there were significantly different experiences of equivalent interac-
tions due to a manipulation in the identity of the cooperative team-mate. Essentially,
the framework recognizes key elements that the human player considers and is influ-
enced by as they engage with their team-mate. These involve social concerns and at-
tempts to infer the mental states of the team-mate, which are engaged differently when
cooperating with human and computer team-mates.
10.1 Requirements for an explanatory framework
In order to be useful for understanding people cooperating with team-mates, we pro-
pose that an explanatory framework should address expectations of the team-mate, self
directed concerns, social motivations, and should discuss how the team-mate experi-
ence unfolds over time. The empirical studies revealed a number of factors that an
explanatory framework needs to address. The studies presented earlier in this docu-
ment revealed differences in evaluations, perceptions, and behaviors of human players
depending on the framing of the identity of their team-mates.
From the study on enjoyment, it seemed that players expect cooperative games to be
more enjoyable when played with another person and even though there was no actual
social interaction, they seemed to seek it out and felt obliged to notice the efforts of
their human team-mate.
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The studies on credit/blame assignment and perception of cooperation/risk taking re-
vealed that players felt some sense of obligation to the human team-mate as well–
players resisted assigning blame to other humans, and felt obliged to recognize coop-
erative behaviors. In addition, the stereotypes for human and computer capabilities led
to very different judgemental evaluations of similar events. The proposed framework
should provide some explanation for how these judgemental differences come about.
The framework should also provide explanations for the differences in behavior in
terms of protection and sacrifice of team-mates. The results of the studies that revealed
these differences suggest that players expected very different abilities and needs from
their team-mates on an ongoing basis, even though the actual behavior was the same.
The results of those studies also suggest that players managed their choices in part due
to imagined social pressures of human-human interaction which were not present when
they played with a computer tea-mate.
Among the existing frameworks, there does not seem to be any that apply directly to
the cooperative game context to explain the differences in response to human and com-
puter team-mates. While game theory mathematical models focus on cost/benefit and
prediction of behavior, models that address social aspects of interactions focus mainly
on the communication between team-mates with an overly broad scope of cooperation.
Other related models seem to focus primarily on explicit communication as the most
critical aspect of the interaction [62, 89, 4]. At a high level, we can represent their
focus in a simple diagram with a participant and a team-mate with most of the interper-
sonal concern on using a communication channel to share explicit messages as shown
in Figure 10.1. While we recognize that each of these models brings some insights
about the cooperative context, the focus of the research in this thesis is on cooperative
games in which players orient to the shared goals and try to understand the intentions
of each other as shown in Figure 10.2. With the game related goals as a main focus, we
propose a model that helps describe how team-mates understand each other, cooperate,
and behave toward each other in the game.
Figure 10.1: Communication centric models focus on maintenance of the communica-
tion channel, relationship, and effectiveness of sharing messages.
10.2 Cooperative Attribution Framework: Main Com-
ponents
In this section we describe our original explanatory framework, the Cooperative At-
tribution Framework (CAF), which was developed taking input from related theories
10.2. COOPERATIVE ATTRIBUTION FRAMEWORK: MAIN COMPONENTS 57
Figure 10.2: Communication model in cooperative games involves more focus on the
game goals in combination with the communication between team-mates
from social psychology and other frameworks that have been used to explain cooper-
ative interactions. The CAF is not proposed as a tool that predicts all future behavior
with statistical strength, however it serves as a process to evaluate the likely outcomes
in interactions comparing human and artificial team-mates. The framework proposes
that players adopt different schemas and scriptswhen interacting with human and com-
puter team-mates. We propose that participants have expectations set from the very
beginning of the interaction that have lasting effects.
In the studies conducted as part of this thesis, there was a top-down treatment of the re-
search subjects through priming, which subconsciously caused them to use the schema
matched to the identity of their team-mate, thus shaping the perception of the stimuli
[25]. The process begins when the player, consciously and subconsciously, chooses
stereotypes that fit the identity of their team-mate, which drive their social motiva-
tions and bring to mind personal consequences of their own behavior. The player then
adopts a mental schema appropriate for their team-mate which affects the processing of
events in the game, giving more attention to events that are relevant for the respective
team-mate schema and paying less attention to events in the game that are not relevant.
As the game proceeds, players seek confirming evidence of the stereotypes and employ
strategies to understand the intentions of their team-mate. The cycle begins again as the
player makes an internal assessment of the stereotypes and schemas and then continues
to try to understand their team-mates actions and intentions.
When the player prepares to enter the game experience, they learn about the game,
understand the goals and types of actions that can bring about success and failure. They
are also told the identity of their team-mate (human or computer), which causes the
subject to recall stereotypes for typical human and computer team-mates. The subject
then adopts an appropriate schema to understand and cooperate with that team-mate.
The experience then begins based upon the categorical beliefs about the team-mate.
During the game play, the subject makes attempts to deepen their understanding of the
team-mate to either reinforce the stereotypes or to build a more accurate impression of
the team-mate. The Cooperative Attribution Framework (CAF) is an organized set of
concerns that are essential to the cooperative experience and are basic components that
capture some of the differences in the schemas for human and computer team-mates.
The framework recognizes that the player experience is affected by what they believe
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about their team-mate in terms of abilities, intentions, behaviors, in combination with
self-directed concerns of the social context. There are strategies that people use to
infer the mental states of their team-mate with and without direct evidence. The two
self-centric concerns include social motivations and personal consequences as shown
in Figure 10.3.
Figure 10.3: Basic components of the Cooperative Attribution Framework
The strategies and personal concerns run in parallel and can influence each other. In
Figure 10.4 the six main components that make up the CAF are presented. There are
columns with “?” symbols to indicate that at each of these components, an assessment
should be made about how the component relates to the player in that context. The
same assessment is completed for both human and computer team-mates, which results
in an inventory of differences in concerns. It is important to note that the diagram does
not intend to convey any particular order in which these influence the experience –
some of these are dominant throughout the experience (e.g. stereotypes are dominant
throughout) while others are dominant at specific times during the experience. The
process flow is described in (Section 10.5).
We now examine the concept of schemas as the foundation of the framework.
10.2.1 Schemas and Person Perception
The results of the game studies already described suggest that when players cooperate
with a team-mate, differences in the identity of their team-mate result in significantly
different experiences and behaviors. Previous research does not completely explain
these differences, yet various theories from social psychology, cognitive science, and
findings from neurological studies provide insights and have informed the construction
of an explanatory framework. The proposed framework is based on the concept of
schemas, which are ways the mind uses categories and scripts to understand and learn
about new things in the world. The explanatory framework proposed, called the Coop-
erative Attribution Framework (CAF) claims that players have different expectations
from human and computer team-mates, which results in the player attending more to
certain elements during the game, interpreting events differently, behaving differently,
and then reflecting upon the game experience differently.
Researchers from various disciplines have been interested in plausible explanations for
how people understand and perceive events in the world. It is widely accepted that peo-
ple generally do not process and store information objectively as if they were a video
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Figure 10.4: Basic components of the Cooperative Attribution Framework
recorder capturing raw information for later playback, but that the mind uses cognitive
tools to process information as it is coming into consciousness and stored as memories.
Schemas, as proposed by Bartlett [14], and later refined by Piaget [80], propose that the
human mind uses thought models, or cognitive rules for understanding. These ways of
knowing the world are categorical patterns the mind uses to fill in missing pieces of in-
formation and directs the mind to attend more to expected stimuli. As an example, we
can imagine that a person has an idea about what a horse is. This internal set of qual-
ities and variables makes up their “schema” for a horse, and guides their expectations
for future examples of horses they may encounter. The schema for a horse is called
up and used either due to the salience of factors (e.g. four-legged animal, long tail,
etc.) or through priming (e.g. someone is told that they will encounter a horse). While
the subconscious role of schemas usually helps a person expect and react appropriately
in the world, it can also lead to “filling in blanks” and perceiving more than what is
there [24], and can lead to very different interpretations of the same event. Closely
related to schemas are “scripts”, which are “expectation bundles” that “. . . direct cogni-
tive processing toward the appropriate inference” [1]. In recent HCI research, the focus
on schemas and social scripts has examined the triggers of social responses to flattery
from artificial agents [57] and has inspired the development of adaptive conversational
agents that detect the schema and social script that the user seems to be adopting and
then adjust the system for an appropriate response [59].
Person perception is a closely related concept to schemas. It focuses on how people
make assessments of another person based on categorical information (e.g. stereo-
types) and individual characteristics through additional evidence. Research suggests
that people make judgments of others very quickly based largely on categorical in-
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formation (e.g. in less than 30 seconds [5]). As noted in [95], however, these quick
assessments can also be made in the absence of observable evidence, in which case
stereotypes can guide the perception leading to the inferences of traits that are perhaps
not actually present. Fisk proposed a model of impression formation based on a con-
tinuum of processes that people use to form impressions of others [36]. On one end are
category-based processes (stereotypes), and on the other are individuating processes
that are free from stereotypes and use the target’s particular attributes and exclude the
category membership. It is proposed that impression formation does not use one or
the other exclusively, but a mix of these to varying degrees. Their model proposes
that people begin an interaction with expectations driven by stereotypes and further
evidence is sought out to confirm those stereotypes – people tend to gravitate toward
category based inferences. In the various studies reported in this thesis, we found sup-
porting evidence for this tendency – participants began the game sessions expecting
their team-mates to behave according to their expectations and they rationalized the
observed behavior so that it would fit accordingly.
In summary, our framework proposes that the players evaluate their team-mates differ-
ently because the manipulation of identity leads them to adopt a schema, which guides
the processing of game events differently. We now describe the self-centric concerns
of the CAF.
10.3 Cooperative Attribution Framework: Self-centric
concerns
When making evaluations of team-mates, players consider how their behaviors and
experience fits into a social context. This is described in the framework as the self-
centric concerns of social motivations and personal consequences. Social motivations
capture the feelings that players have regarding their social needs and how these are met
or could be met by their team-mate. Personal consequences are the pressures players
feel as they maintain their social contract with their team-mates. These are described
now in more detail.
10.3.1 Social Motivations
Social motivations include the social benefits of interacting with others, social atten-
tion, sharing an experience, engaging in joint-activity, building something with others.
Essentially, these are social elements that the player seeks out and finds satisfaction of
their social needs by interacting with team-mates in the cooperative context.
People are social, we find enjoyment in social interaction, and our brains are wired
to be a cooperative species [9], perhaps this is part of the reason why cooperative
games are so popular. Recent studies have focused on understanding how players orient
themselves and seek out social benefits in interactive games [72, 34, 35, 23].
Research suggests that people try to sense the emotions of others in their social group
resulting in “emotional contagion” [13], in which the members of the group will try
to match the emotions of the others. In our studies, the subjects could not commu-
nicate verbally with their team-mate and could not see the expressions of their team-
mate. While our studies did not involve communication between team-mates aside
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from avatar position and the blinking to signal risk-taking, the research on communica-
tion using minimal bandwidth [50] suggests that team-mates seek out communication
through a shared medium even when it does not provide the richness of voice or video.
In our own studies that examined the potential of communication and its actual use
among team-mates, it was found that players feel as though they need and enjoy games
when social communication is possible, even though the use of the communication
channel is minimal [63]. .
With human team-mates, cooperative games involve many social benefits and influ-
ences even when the social elements of the game are minimal or imagined. These
include the following:
• seeking out the satisfaction of social needs (social contact, nurturance, social
attention, etc.)
• engaging in prosocial behavior (helping, altruistic acts, etc.)
• building and maintaining a social identity (group identity) [52]
To capture the social motivations of the player, the following questions should be
posed. In order to ask these questions, the participant is not asked directly, but through
measures including questionnaires related to the topic, open-ended feedback, contex-
tual interviews, and observation.
• What are the social needs met by the interaction?
• Is there potential for social communication?
• Is there a sense of co-presence?
• Is there an opportunity for receiving/giving nurturance?
• How does the sense of team identity impact perception or behavior?
We now turn to the category of personal consequences, which considers the feelings of
obligation and consequences of action as a team-mate.
10.3.2 Personal Consequences
Personal consequences involve a calculating aspect of human social behavior. Players
consider (and usually follow) what they believe a respectful or polite player might do.
In well known research on commitments and cooperation [52], it was proposed that
team-mates protect their social identity within the social group. Players strive to main-
tain their good name among their peers and in the case of cooperative games, when a
player agrees to play, there is a social contract that binds the player. Expectations of
the player require fair behavior, working toward shared goals, etc. Research suggests
that the perception of co-player identity significantly influences the way people reflect
and attend to social interactions in the virtual world. In [87], researchers noted sim-
ilar brain activity when people were treated fairly or unfairly, but the activation was
stronger when interacting with a human.
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Players subconsciously ask themselves, “What am I expected to do? If I do X, will I be
considered a selfish or negative player? Will this affect how my team-mate or others
feel about me?” Personal consequences extend beyond the player-player interaction
and also include how players might be perceived by the outside world. For example,
sacrificing a computer team-mate might be a clever action and doesn’t make a player
seem like a bad person, however sacrificing a human player who has struggled together
in the game might be considered disrespectful or ungrateful.
Questions that can be asked to explore the personal consequences in a particular game
include the following:
• Does it matter how the player feels, perceives, or behaves?
• What are the implied or explicit social contracts?
• (positive consequences) What are the benefits? What opportunities are presented
to be labeled as helpful, fair, polite, etc?
• (negative consequences) What are the costs? What are the potential aspects that
could be labeled as impolite, rude, unfair, lazy, etc?
We have presented the self-centric concerns of social motivations and personal conse-
quences. We now turn to the strategies players use to infer the mental states of their
team-mates.
10.4 Cooperative Attribution Framework: Inferringmen-
tal states
This section describes the four main strategies people use in order to understand the be-
havior, thoughts, intentions, and feelings of their team-mate. Two of the strategies rely
on observable evidence and the other two involve filling in details from the observer’s
preconceived notion of the team-mate. We first describe the closely related concepts of
Theory of Mind and “mindreading”, which describe how people infer the mental states
of others. We then present the four strategies of inferring mental states and discuss how
these strategies apply to the cooperative game context.
Humans excel at understanding and acting within complex social situations. People
navigate social situations and adjust their own perception of events and modify their
behavior and attitudes based on what others think, feel, or want [6]. When people try
to infer the mental states of others when co-located, they use many strategies including
facial/non-verbal cues, conversation, and they watch the behaviors over time. With a
model of what their partner thinks, the player makes judgments about intention, effort,
and predictions about future cooperation.
The concept known as “theory of mind” (ToM) [82] is used to explain how a person
imagines the mental states and capabilities of another person in order to predict their
behavior or intentions. This can help in understanding past behaviors of others and
helps in predicting their intentions and future behavior. In order for someone to have a
ToM of another, they have to be able to recognize that the other has their own perspec-
tive and is able to keep an ongoing running record of what is likely to be in the memory
of the other. Humans are exceptionally adept at doing this unconsciously and there is
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evidence that some animals have a limited ToM as well. The act of inferring the men-
tal states of another is also called “mindreading”, and is believed to be engaged when
observing unpredictable behavior, or when the perceiver doesn’t have control over the
actions being observed, or when the perceiver is motivated to connect with another
(e.g. social motivations) as proposed in [98]. They go on to describe various impacts
of mindreading, most importantly, that when a person perceives an interpersonal ac-
tion as intentional, it is experienced more intensely than random acts, and the response
to these acts often involve an increased attention to fairness. Based on the stereotype
data gathered in our studies, evidence suggests that people have doubts in the mental
capacities of a typical AI agent. Participants rated agents significantly less favorably
in terms of the qualities related to complex thought including understanding, ability
to adapt, etc. There have been various attempts to build artificial agents that have a
ToM in virtual agents [48] and robots [47, 21] which attempt to convince the user that
the agent has complex mental states. Researchers have proposed that artificial agents
would need to display observable cues, for example, joint attention through eye contact
[12], in order to allow people to naturally interpret behavior of an artificial agent [28].
In research related to ToM and mentalizing [42], researchers proposed that mirror neu-
rons, which are active when one performs an action or when watching another perform
an action [90], are linked to the mentalizing process and suggest that the brain simu-
lates what it sees the other person doing as a way to empathize and understand the other
person. Mirror neuron research also suggests that humans can’t resist but to react by
mirroring [31] when exposed to stimuli, even when faced with still images, suggesting
that exposure to media produces similar effects.
There are various examples of research that have examined and compared brain activity
in interactions with human and computer agents. These studies suggest that although
people use similar strategies to interact with and understand artificial team-mates, dif-
ferences in the levels of activation, however, suggest that the human struggles to un-
derstand an artificial agent. Among this research, there is evidence that suggests that
watching a robot reach for something [77] or concentrate on the robot’s facial expres-
sions [27] causes a person to empathize with that action due to an increase in brain
activity associated with “mirror neurons”. Research also suggests that when people
observe an altruistic act, there is a part of the brain that tries to determine if that act
is performed by a living or non-living agent [70]. Results from game-related research
suggest that there is more activation in a region of the brain known for mentalizing
when playing against a human compared to a computer [41, 83].
Social psychologists have proposed various categories of ways that people try to “read
the mind” of an interaction partner. Ames [7] proposed a simple model to understand
the various ‘mind-reading’ strategies that people employ as shown in Figure 10.5 con-
sisting of evidence-based strategies (observable behaviors and observed emotions) and
extratarget strategies (stereotyping and projecting one’s own mental states). This model
is used as a starting point to explain how players think, feel, and behave in cooperative
games depending on what they think their team-mate thinks, wants, or feels.
This process of inferring mental states is active in the cooperative game context, even
in the mediated environment of a networked game in which players are represented as
avatars on a two-dimensional screen and don’t have full communication they would
have when co-located. The mediated environment forces the player to engage the
strategies differently than face to face interactions. For example, movements of the
avatar can be interpreted as emotional expressions – fast jerky movements exhibit emo-
tional excitement, changes in direction can signal indecision, etc. This thesis applies
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Figure 10.5: Mindreading strategies proposed by Ames 2004
the strategies of mindreading to the cooperative game context and proposes that the
human player tries to engage the same strategies for human and computer team-mates.
However, in interactions with human team-mates, the player feels confident in applying
these strategies, finding confirmation in their understanding of the team-mate during
the game session. With a computer team-mate, the player has more conscious doubt
as they try to apply the same strategies, favoring negative stereotypes over objective
evidence, switch between strategies differently, and at times, even abandon some of
the strategies. For example, the player may see fast, jerky movements of their com-
puter team-mate and may, at first, feel compelled to consider it an emotional display
of excitement, however, the player begins to discount the emotions of the team-mate
because it is controlled by a computer whose feelings are not real. In general, am-
biguous movements or behaviors are often discounted and not considered emotional
displays for artificial team-mates. A more detailed description of the four main strate-
gies of inferring mental states is now described including attributions made from the
evidence-based strategies by observing behaviors in context and emotional displays, as
well as extratarget strategies based on projecting mental states and stereotypes.
10.4.1 Evidence-based: Behaviors in context
People make assessments of the behavior of others largely based on the context in
which the behavior takes place. Players consider various factors including the inten-
tion, effort, and capabilities of the team-mate, but also consider the environmental fac-
tors of luck and chance. With more experience with a team-mate, prior behavior builds
a history from which the future behavior can be judged.
Providing more structure to the ways people understand events and interpersonal inter-
actions, attribution theory provides a model for how people make causal attributions for
events in social situations [100, 101]. An important implication from the attributions
people make is that biases and errors are frequently made as a result of the subjective
interpretation of events. Heider introduced the concept of attribution theory in [45] fo-
cusing on the locus of causality and the personal factors of the person including ability
and motivation as key strategies people use to make these assessments of one another.
The locus of causality determined whether the cause of the event was due to innate
qualities of the person (the content of their character, abilities) or due to environmental
factors (bad weather, chance, etc.) As shown in Figure 10.6 when making attributions
10.4. COOPERATIVEATTRIBUTION FRAMEWORK: INFERRINGMENTAL STATES65
of cause, the person considers whether the ability of the person or the environmental
factors affect the capacity for action. Motivation involves the intentions of the per-
son including their goals and plans combined with the level of exertion or effort. By
considering these elements, Heider proposed that people attribute causes to actions.
Figure 10.6: Heider’s attribution theory
An example is may be helpful in illustrating this. Imagine that a baseball player hits a
ball and it flies through the air, out of the stadium for a home run. We can assess the
cause of the home run by considering the four elements. 1) the ability of the player
to hit a ball 2) the environmental factors such as the weather, the chance that he was
pitched an easy ball to hit, etc. 3) we consider the intention of the player to aim for
a home run and 4) we can assess the exertion or effort expended by the player. Dif-
ferent evaluations of these four elements lead to wildly different assessments of the
same objective outcome. For example, if we believe the player was simply lucky to
be pitched the perfect ball, it detracts from the appreciation of the player’s skill and
effort in achieving the feat. On the other hand, if we focus on the exertion and claim
that it was through the extraordinary effort of the player, the praise for the event be-
comes stronger. Attribution theory has been useful in understanding the social percep-
tion, expectations, and outcomes among team-mates in the sports context [91], and has
recently been applied to understanding pedagogical agents, virtual partners [53] and
assessments of robot in a cooperative task [43].
The implication for the present research is that these theories propose that people en-
gage in a constant analysis, whether consciously or subconsciously, as a ‘naive psychol-
ogist’, actively interpreting events as they unfold, assigning the appropriate emotions,
but also adjusting expectations for future events.
Attribution related theories provide explanations for why people value one thing over
another when making assessments about the cause of behavior, intentions, effort level,
environmental factors, and other causes. Players bring to bear assumptions about what
people and computers can or cannot do. There are certain types of information that
help people make these judgments including knowledge about the environmental fac-
tors vs. skill of the team-mate, effort level expended toward the team goals, inten-
tions and choice of strategy. With more of this information, the attributions become
easier to make, however, without this information, people tend to make assumptions.
These assumptions are often inaccurate and influenced by stereotypes or other imag-
ined qualities. In the case of the studies presented in this thesis, the actual behavior
was equivalent for both the presumed human and computer, yet differences in the way
subjects made attributions varied significantly, resulting in differences in the percep-
tions based on the manipulation of the team-mate identity. The main components of
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this mindreading strategy are now described:
Observed behavior of the team-mate is compared to previous behavior on an on-going
basis to determine causes for in-game events. There are four main dimensions to these
attributions. A brief explanation and examples are provided for each as follows:
1. (internal vs. external causes) The main concern for this dimension is whether the
target had control over the events or that luck or the environment was attributed.
If the cause seems to be bad luck, the team-mate is less likely to be blamed for
failures. If a failure seems due to qualities of the team-mate, they may be blamed
more harshly.
Example: Did the team-mate have control over when and where to draw fire,
or were they placed in an unfortunate spot on the screen at random? Was the
gunner unfairly targeting them?
2. (skill) This dimension examines the ability of the team-mate to meet the chal-
lenges of the game. If they perform at their ability, the reaction is much different
than if they perform unexpectedly well or poorly.
Example: Is the team-mate skillful enough to draw fire in difficult situations?
3. (effort) This dimension examines the perceived level of effort or exertion of the
team-mate related to the event.
Example: In the attempts to drawing fire, did the team-mate expend enough
effort?
4. (strategy) The player also determines how well the team-mate chose the strategy
in their behaviors.
Example: Did the team-mate choose the best strategy when drawing fire?
These assessments are fairly easy to make for human team-mates and with more expo-
sure to their behavior, we feel more confident in assessing them. However, with an AI
team-mate, this assessment can become problematic. Some of these possible concerns
are as follows:
1. (internal vs. external causes) (control vs. luck) Control and luck are problematic
notions when participants try to imagine the AI team-mate. In some cases, par-
ticipants have reported a suspicion of collusion because the AI team-mate is the
unseen team-mate controlled by the same computer that is hosting the game.
2. (skill) It is problematic to consider the skill of the AI. Traditionally, AI can be
very skillful and demonstrate perfect logic (e.g. computer chess opponents), but
in other cases, artificial agents seem to fail miserably. The human does not know
if, or how the programmer has limited or empowered the abilities of the AI.
3. (effort) When considering the effort of a computer, it is hard to imagine what is
hard or easy for a computer. It is also difficult to consider a computer choosing
its own effort level as if under its own volition.
4. (strategy) Did the computer choose its strategy according to the situation or is it
a pre-programmed response? There may be suspicion that the agent understands
the optimal strategy, but rather unclear whether or not the agent is employing
that strategy.
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In this section we described how players make causal attributions of their team-mate’s
behaviors. We now present an additional mindreading strategy that relies on the per-
ception of emotions of the team-mate.
10.4.2 Evidence-based: Emotional displays
When co-located, players can easily see the expressions of their team-mate and make
adjustments to their concept of what their team-mate is thinking or intending. Based on
facial expressions, sounds uttered, or other ways of perceiving emotions, the behavior
is evaluated leading to very different interpretations of the same event. Using baseball
once again as an example, if someone hits a baseball that breaks a car window and
they smile or laugh, we feel angry. However, if the person shows remorse or conveys a
surprised expression, we may not feel angry, but we take pity on them and assume that
they did not intend to break the window.
In the context of the games used in our studies, participants did not have face-to-face
contact with their team-mates and played games that used very simple avatars to rep-
resent them on the screen. Although the possibility for rich emotional displays was
limited, evidence from the studies suggests that participants imagined emotions of their
team-mate including frustration, fear, pensive concern, etc. through the movements of
their avatars. This “filling in” of the emotional displays occurred mostly for human
team-mates and very rarely for AI team-mates. Participants seemed to expect and read
emotions easily into human team-mates yet they did not imagine their team-mate as
having emotional states.
Another aspect about the avatars is that the movement of the avatars suggests joint
attention in the case that both approach the same spot or avoid the same flurry of bullets.
This is shown to signal ToM in people as they recognize the other is focusing on the
same object in their environment. Perhaps noticing where a human team-mate’s avatar
is moving toward reassures the player that their team-mate is “thinking” about the same
things.
We now turn to examine the extratarget stategies of mindreading.
10.4.3 Extra-target: Projecting
One of the ways in which we judge the intentions or feelings of another is by consid-
ering what we would think or feel in that circumstance and then, if appropriate, we
assume that it is reasonable for our team-mate to also think in the same way. If a task is
terribly hard for us, we appreciate the difficulty of the challenge and if we see someone
else do the same task, we imagine that it is also difficult for them.
Another way to phrase this is to assume the player considers, “Howwould I react?” The
player then tries to imagine, to what degree their team-mate would react in the same
way. We can again return to the example of the baseball that breaks a car window. If
we witness a person hit a baseball that then breaks a car window, we consider how we
would react (remorseful of an accident), and then determine if it makes sense to project
that same emotion on to the person who hit the baseball. In this example, if we feel
comfortable projecting the feeling of remorse, we may not blame the person who hits
the baseball, but if we have difficulty imagining that the person could feel the same
way we do, it makes the projection problematic.
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There are various studies that explore projection, some of which is summarized in [55],
which highlights the notion that we assess others’ actions based on our own repertoire
of actions. In the studies presented in this thesis, projecting of emotions happened more
with the human team-mate; participants engaged in perspective taking, and demon-
strated a willingness to empathize and imagine the feelings of the other.
In terms of the computer team-mate, it is problematic to consider that the agent would
be able to have the same complex mental states. For example, what does it mean for
the AI to struggle to avoid something, or to take risks, or to have sympathy, etc. It
becomes difficult and less likely that the personal projections will occur and as is the
case when people feel dissimilar, stereotypes and category based impressions become
dominant [6].
10.4.4 Extra-target: Stereotypes
Perhaps the most important of the strategies used to understand team-mates is reliance
on preconceived stereotypes. The effects of stereotypes on perception and behavior
has been proposed to be very powerful, whether the person is consciously aware of
it or not [11]. Stereotypes are the first and initial guidance subjects use to prepare
for the cooperative experience and the manipulation of identity affects the top-down
processing, driving the subject to select an appropriate schema that fits what they expect
from their team-mate [37].
The power of expectation impacts experience in significant ways. Studies that explored
the placebo effect provide many compelling examples of this. Research results suggest
that when people believe they are taking a pain medication, the brain activity alters and
reduces the experience of pain [97]. Many examples, well summarized in [64], suggest
that the placebo effect can even affect inner organ functioning, gastric activity, asthma,
among others. Evidence from a well known study on wine tasting suggests that when
people think a wine is more expensive, the brain actually becomes more active in the
pleasure related areas – people actually enjoyed it more [81].
During gameplay the subject continually re-evaluates their team-mate and the observed
behavior, however, the research suggests that people tend to move toward category
based perception in normal interactions and even more so when under time pressure. In
the studies presented in this thesis, research subjects answered questions which enabled
the collection of stereotypes for typical human and computer agents. These stereotypes
help in explaining the initial expectations subjects had for their team-mates, but also
provided insights about how the subjects engaged with other mindreading strategies
(humans are more adaptive, influencing beliefs about abilities, strategy selection, inten-
tion, etc.), provided insights about their own effort with team-mates (subjects claimed
that it was more important to try hard to win with human team-mates), and precon-
ceived ideas about what it means to play cooperative games with a computer agent
(cooperative games are more fun with human team-mates).
We now examine how the framework can be applied to understanding the results of
cooperative game interactions with human and computer team-mates.
10.5 Cooperative Attribution Framework: Process flow
The application of the CAF is similar in some ways to the continuum model of im-
pression [36]. We propose that the process is a cycle that repeats continuously during
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the cooperative context as the player tries to come to grips with the team-mate (e.g.
expectations, how to process events). We now present an overview of the process flow
shown in Figure 10.7 from the initial manipulation of identity (labeled start). Each step
is labeled with a number corresponding to the order of the process flow, which is now
described in detail.
Figure 10.7: The typical process flow applying the Cooperative Attribution Framework
to the cooperative game context
1. Identity of the team-mate is set in the mind of the player
2. Stereotypes are considered as the typical team-mate is envisioned, Social Moti-
vations are considered along with the goals of the game, Personal consequences
are considered as the person considers maintaining the social contract with the
team-mate and managing their social identity
3. Schemas, Scripts are selected which seem appropriate, this influences the next
step in the process by driving selective attention and expectations
4. Behaviors in context reflect causal attribution, Emotional Displays are imag-
ined to varying degrees, Personal Projections from the player are made to vary-
ing degrees.
5. Schemas Evaluated to determine how good they are as a fit for the observed
behavior. If they are a good fit, the player revisits, reinforces the stereotypes
and continues the process at step 2. If the schemas are a bad fit, the player must
consider why it is a bad fit.
6. The player considers, is it a Special Case for the schema? If the answer is
“no”, it is considered just an outlier or chance difference and the player continues
the process by reconfirming the stereotype. If the answer is “yes”, the player
considers what adjustments need to be made.




In this chapter, we presented the Cooperative Attribution Framework (CAF), based on
the concept of schemas, which is proposed as a tool that explains the differences in
emotional and judgmental evaluations of human and computer team-mates in cooper-
ative games. We began by reviewing three existing frameworks that have attempted to
explain cooperative interactions, finding that the focus of these frameworks were too
general or more appropriate for conversational interactions. The six components of
the Cooperative Attribution Framework were described including the self-centric con-
cerns and building from strategies of mindreading. The process was presented, which
demonstrates how these six components are engaged during cooperative interactions
as the person continuously adjusts their expectations of the their team-mate. In the
next chapter, we apply the CAF to the results of our studies and the results from other
studies discussed in the related work (Chapter 2).
Chapter 11
Discussion
This chapter applies the Cooperative Attribution Framework to the studies conducted
as part of this thesis. This demonstrates how the framework helps to explain the dif-
ferences in response to team-mates identified as human or computer-controlled. In
order to justify the framework, it is also applied to the results of two studies discussed
previously in the Related Work (Chapter 2).
This chapter begins with a brief discussion about how the phases of the studies (partici-
pants played the games once with each team-mate), led the subjects to adopt a compar-
ative frame of mind when evaluating their experience. We also discuss how this may
have affected the results of the studies. This is followed by an in-depth review of the
study results comparing the differences in response to computer and human team-mates
for each of the studies described earlier by presenting a side-by-side comparison of the
CAF elements, followed by a review of the process flow for the game experience with
the human and computer team-mate. When the framework is applied to these results
it becomes clear why the participants have a significantly different experience playing
with a human or computer team-mate. It is proposed that the differences observed are
broadly the result of being unable to imagine that an AI team-mate could have cer-
tain attributes (e.g., emotional dispositions). One of the more important aspects of this
insight is that the “inability to imagine” impacts decisions and judgements that seem
quite unrelated. As an example, when players believe their AI team-mate does not have
the capacity to have complex emotions or differences in effort, the assignment of credit
and blame differs. This chapter concludes with discussion about the limitations of the
framework.
11.1 Phases of User Studies
This section describes how the user studies encouraged the research subjects to adopt
a comparative frame of mind when interacting in the game sessions. We present the
four phases of the typical user study and provide an in-depth review of the reflective
thoughts that players likely had in each of the phases. While the design of the studies
caused the participants to scrutinize their team-mates more in the between-subjects
experiments, the order of exposure was balanced and randomized – statistical tests
ruled out any effects of order on the self-reported measures.
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The four phases of the typical user studies presented in this thesis included the Pre-
game, Game Session 1, Game Session 2, and Post-game. In the pre-game phase, stereo-
types drive initial expectations of the game, leading to the selection of schemas that the
player feels would be most suitable for understanding and participating in the upcom-
ing experience. The participant begins to think comparatively about their prospective
team-mates. During the game sessions, the use of these different schemas result in dif-
ferences in perception and behavior in cooperative games depending upon the identity
of the team-mate being either human or computer. In the post-game phase, the partici-
pant reflects on the experience filling in missing details with information guided by the
schemas and stereotypes.
In most of the game studies we conducted, the participant played with one team-mate
before they were asked questions about the experience after which, they played the
game again with a different team-mate. In the first game experience, the player does
not know what questions will be asked about the experience, but presumes that the
questions to be asked will focus on the performance of the team-mate including strat-
egy, effectiveness, etc. In the second game experience, however, the participant knows
the types of questions being asked and is able to focus closely on aspects of the game
that they feel are most relevant. The participants were not told about the specifics of
each question before the first game for the following reasons: 1) the participant would
not be able to remember all of the questions and may selectively choose to think about
a subset of those questions during the game session, 2) the participant had just become
familiar with the game and would likely have difficulty in focusing on all aspects of
the game if it was revealed what is important to the researchers, and 3) any differences
may have been exaggerated by preparing the participants with questions.
The typical user study experience discussed in this thesis follows the form as shown in
Figure 11.1: 1) Pre-game phase 2) Game session 1 3) Game session 2 4) Post-game
comparison and reflection.
As noted previously in the results of the user studies, statistical tests ruled out effect
of order of exposure, thus the between subjects design of the studies did not cause a
significant impact to the differences in the response to either team-mate.
We now examine each of the studies using the CAF to facilitate the analysis of the
results.
11.2 Applying the Framework: Enjoyment/Preference
In the chapter that presented the study results for the enjoyment/preference study, evi-
dence suggested that participants preferred human team-mates and reported more en-
joyment with them compared to AI team-mates. In this section, the cooperative attri-
bution framework is used to explain these results, first with a brief summary followed
by a detailed review of the results using the framework.
11.2.1 Overview of differences
The higher level of enjoyment with human team-mates is largely due to a sense that
cooperation with another human carries more social benefits of a “real” social interac-
tion, even without any actual social contact outside of the game. Supporting evidence
from stereotype related questions suggest that players have a schema for a “cooperative
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Figure 11.1: Phases of the typical user studies. Chronological time runs left to right for
the phases and top to bottom within the phases.
game”, of which a human team-mate is a crucial component for enjoyment. The par-
ticipant watches and interacts with their human team-mate’s avatar feeling comfortable
in reading emotions and intentions, whereas with the computer team-mate, there is no
authentic social experience, and no shared emotionally charged moments. Participants
evaluate the computer team-mates simply for their performance in the game.
Participants preferred the human team-mate because they were perceived as being more
thoughtful, understanding, and flexible. Being a cooperative game, the participant feels
obligated to recognize the effort and struggle of their human team-mate and appreciates
the effort given by the human team-mate.
The following detailed analysis examines the six categories of the framework to iden-
tify which of the categories have a dominant influence on the differences noted in the
study results. We proposed that a comparison can be made for each of the six cate-
gories and how they relate to human an computer team-mates as shown in Figure 10.4.
We present provide the side-by-side comparison in Table 11.1.
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imagine that team-mate can
feel at all)
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Stereotypes (More enjoyment: social
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alone is not social)
High
Table 11.1: Enjoyment/Preference: comparison of Human and AI team-mate. Domi-
nance refers to how influential this is on the rating of enjoyment/preference
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11.2.2 Framework Process Flow: Enjoyment/Preference
The framework is now applied to the enjoyment/preference study. We present a di-
agram to illustrate how the experience unfolds when interacting with either a human
team-mate or a computer team-mate. We discuss the step by step process for the human
team-mate, followed by the computer team-mate to serve as a comparison.
Figure 11.2: Process flow of CAF and the sacrifice study results indicating stereotypes,
social motivations, and personal consequences as highly dominant, behaviors in con-
text, emotional displays, and perceiver’s own mental states have a moderate influence.
HUMAN TEAM-MATE: Enjoyment/Preference
To summarize the higher rating of enjoyment and preference for the presumed human
team-mate, the schema for cooperative gamewould define it as an activity that involves
enjoying an activity with another human. The player enters the game with this expec-
tation and also expects that the team-mate adapts well to the situation at hand, is more
understanding and that the interactions with them will be a valid form of social atten-
tion. There is also an obligation to recognize the efforts of the human and to appreciate
their intention to cooperate. The player feels more comfortable imagining the team-
mate as a partner having an emotional experience. The player feels more of a shared
social experience, which is more enjoyable. In addition, the schema for cooperative
game includes more enjoyment with a human. Upon reflection of the experience, the
player feels more enjoyment with the presumed human.
Upon reflection of the experience, the player returns to their initial stereotypes for
human team-mates and what they expect from a cooperative game and feel confident
in claiming more enjoyment and preference for the human team-mate.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is human-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical human team-mates are brought to mind
and include a an image of a team-mate who is understanding, adapts to the
situation. Among the stereotypes, the player believes that cooperative games are
fun because of a human team-mate.
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(a) Social Motivations: player imagines that the interaction carries real social
benefits and social attention.
(b) Personal consequences: claims of enjoyment are obligated because the
player feels social pressure to recognize/acknowledging team-mate effort.
If player doesn’t recognize that it is more fun, then they just don’t “get it”
3. Schemas, Scripts: The player expects that the human team-mate will give as
much effort as possible, will try to adapt and coordinate, is motivated by the
goal in the game, but also motivated by the social interaction. In assessing all
the behaviors of the team-mate, the player looks for evidence to confirm and to
support these expectations.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: more perceived intention, effort, more confidence
in the partner, which is appreciated (internal causes for successful actions)
• Emotional Displays: player easily imagines the emotions of the team-
mate, which brings a sense of comfort. For example, during tense moments,
the player imagines a person struggling, with rich expressions.
• Personal Projections: player feels comfortable in projecting their own
emotions and feels comfortable making assumptions about how the team-
mate is likely reacting emotionally to events in the game.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
COMPUTER TEAM-MATE: Enjoyment/Preference
To summarize the lower rating of enjoyment and preference against the computer team-
mate, the schema for cooperative game would define it as an activity that involves
enjoying an activity with another human. The player enters the game with this ex-
pectation, but also considers that the computer team-mate can not adapt well to the
situation and is not very understanding. Furthermore, interactions with them are not a
valid form of social attention and there is no sense of obligation to recognize the efforts
of the computer, and the computer team-mate is not imagined to be an emotional agent.
Upon reflection of the experience, the player returns to their initial stereotypes for
computer team-mates and what they expect from a cooperative game and since there
was not strong evidence to change their stereotypes or schemas, they downplay their
level of enjoyment with the computer team-mate.
1. Identity: player is told their computer is human-controlled.
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2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical computer team-mates are brought to mind
and include a an image of a team-mate who is LESS understanding, DOES NOT
adapt well to the situation. Among the stereotypes, the player believes that co-
operative games are less fun with a computer team-mate.
(a) Social Motivations: player does not feel that the interaction carries ANY
social benefits of social attention from the team-mate (some described it as
playing alone).
(b) Personal consequences: there is no obligation to recognize/acknowledging
team-mate effort
3. Schemas, Scripts: The player expects that the computer team-mate will simply
follow the instructions in its algorithm, and therefore will not adapt or coordi-
nate well. The player is motivated by the goal in the game, not by the social
interaction. In assessing all the behaviors of the team-mate, the player looks for
evidence to confirm and to support these expectations.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: more critical of failures, which are claimed to be
deficiencies in the algorithm (internal causes for failures)
• Emotional Displays: the player does not imagine that the computer team-
mate has emotions.
• Personal Projections: player can not imagine that the computer can have
the same mental states, therefore, emotions are not shared, and does not
project their emotions onto the team-mate
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
11.3 Applying the Framework: Credit/Blame/Skill As-
sessment
In the chapter that presented the study results for the credit/blame/skill study, evidence
suggested that participants assigned blame unfairly to computer team-mates, and as-
sessed there own skill level higher than the computer team-mate. In this section, the
cooperative attribution framework is used to explain these results, first with a brief
summary followed by a detailed review of the results using the framework.
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11.3.1 Overview of differences
In terms of assignment of blame, the framework reveals that player made a fundamen-
tal attribution error in assigning blame to human and computer team-mates. When
the human team-mate failed, the participants attributed the failure to causes that were
beyond the control of the team-mate (bad luck, game circumstances), thus exonerat-
ing them from blame. For computer team-mates, however, failures were attributed to
causes within the control of the team-mate (poor AI algorithm, not adaptable), thus
increasing the blame assigned to them.
Stereotypes led participants to expect and perceive human team-mates to be adaptable
and giving effort as the game situation demanded, while the stereotypes for AI team-
mates led them to expect rigid actions and inability to adapt according to the game
demands. This “inability” to imagine that AI team-mates had these mental capacities
caused negative assessments of equivalent behavior, and since there are no pressures
to be polite or considerate of feelings, the negative assessments were very direct and
harsh. Furthermore, players felt more comfortable projecting their own emotions with
human team-mates, thus when failure events occurred, they assumed their team-mate
was lamenting the error, and giving more effort as needed.
In terms of skill assessment, participants felt personal pressure to be polite and encour-
aging toward their human team-mates, therefore, they rated the human team-mate at
a similar skill level to themselves or higher. However, for the computer team-mates,
there was no pressure to be polite and the stereotypes held about computers being un-
able to adapt led the players to assess the skills of the computer team-mates lower than
their presumed human team-mates and lower than their own, even when objectively,
the computer team-mate was more successful than the participant.
The overview of how the framework explains these differences is provided in Ta-
ble 11.2.
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Table 11.2: Credit/Blame/Skill assessment: comparison of Human and AI team-mate.
Dominance refers to how influential this is on the assignment of credit/blame/skill
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11.3.2 Framework Process Flow: Credit/Blame/Skill
The framework is now applied to the credit/blame/skill study presented in a diagram to
illustrate how the experience unfolds when interacting with either a human team-mate
or a computer team-mate. The differences are then discussed.
Figure 11.3: Process flow of CAF and the sacrifice study results indicating stereo-
types, personal consequences, behaviors in context, and perceiver’s own mental state
as highly dominant.
HUMAN TEAM-MATE: Credit/Blame/Skill
To summarize the reduced amount of blame assigned to the presumed human team-
mate, the schema and stereotypes for a human team-mate lead the player to enter the
game expecting that the human will make active attempts to adapt to the situation.
The player also feels comfortable in projecting their own thoughts and feelings about
the game events, making assumptions that the human player laments the failures and
engages emotionally giving more effort to bring about success in the game. The player
also feels some personal pressure to judge ambiguous events in favor of the team-mate.
Upon reflection of the experience, the player returns to their initial stereotypes for
human team-mates and is likely to blame external causes for failures (e.g bad luck,
opponent unfairly targeted them, etc.)
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is human-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical human team-mates are brought to mind and
include a an image of a team-mate who is understanding, adapts to the situation.
Among the stereotypes, the player believes that it is more important to try hard
to win when playing with a human team-mate. They are likely to imagine the
human holding the same beliefs.
(a) Social Motivations: player imagines that the interaction carries some so-
cial benefits, thus criticism is given politely and with kindness.
(b) Personal consequences: much pressure to be polite and respectful. Should
not be unfair, or self-centered, therefore, the human is given the benefit of
the doubt when assigning blame.
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3. Schemas, Scripts: The player expects that the human team-mate will give as
much effort as possible, will try to adapt and coordinate. In assessing all the be-
haviors of the team-mate, the player looks for evidence to confirm and to support
these expectations.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: more perceived intention, effort, more confidence
in the partner, therefore, blame for failures is attributed to external causes
(e.g. bad luck)
• Emotional Displays: player imagines emotions through the team-mate
movements. For example, during tense moments, their team-mate strug-
gling and giving effort.
• Personal Projections: player feels comfortable in projecting their own
emotions and feels comfortable making assumptions about how the team-
mate is likely reacting emotionally to events in the game. Therefore, just as
the player laments a failure event, they can imagine the human team-mate
would do the same thing, therefore any blame is tempered.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
COMPUTER TEAM-MATE: Credit/Blame/Skill
To summarize the increased amount of blame assigned to the presumed computer team-
mate, the schema and stereotypes for a computer team-mate lead the player to enter the
game expecting that the computer is more rigid and unable to adapt, which invites
blame attribute to internal causes (e.g. the AI algorithm). The player does not project
their own thoughts and feelings about the game events, assuming that the computer
team-mate does not have the ability for complex emotions, thus the level of effort of the
team-mate is unclear and unchanging. The player does not feel any personal pressure
in the judgments about the team-mate, resulting in more harsh assessments.
Upon reflection of the experience, the player returns to their initial stereotypes for
computer team-mates and is likely to blame internal causes for failures (e.g bad AI
algorithm, inability to adapt, etc.)
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is computer-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical computer team-mates are brought to mind
and include a an image of a team-mate that is rigid, inflexible, not very under-
standing, and not able to adapt to the situation.
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(a) Social Motivations: player does not believe the interaction carries any so-
cial benefits, thus criticism is given harshly.
(b) Personal consequences: the is no pressure to be polite or respectful. The
computer team-mate is assigned blame harshly without concern for fair-
ness.
3. Schemas, Scripts: The player expects that the computer team-mate is rigid and
unable to adapt and coordinate well. In assessing all the behaviors of the team-
mate, the player looks for evidence to confirm and to support these expectations.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: unable to imagine the computer having its own vo-
lition, intention, or effort level, thus blame is attributed to internal causes
(e.g. bad AI algorithm)
• Emotional Displays: player does not imagine emotions in the team-mate
actions, thus blame is not softened or tempered.
• Personal Projections: player does not feel comfortable in projecting their
own emotions and feels more doubtful that the team-mate has intentions or
ability to adapt.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
11.4 Applying the Framework: Cooperation/Risk-taking
In the chapter that presented the study results for the Cooperation/Risk-taking study,
participants rated human team-mates significantly higher for cooperation and the amount
of risk-taking on their behalf compared to AI team-mates. In this section, the cooper-
ative attribution framework is used to explain these results, first with a brief summary
followed by a detailed review of the results using the framework.
11.4.1 Overview of differences
As in previous studies, the findings suggest that top-down effects of the manipulation
of team-mate identity caused the players to subconsciously adopt schemas based on
stereotypes they have about human and computer team-mates. The stereotypes for hu-
man team-mates included beliefs that they are more understanding and adapt to the
situation significantly more than computer team-mate. Participants attended more to
altruistic acts of the human team-mates, considered the effort level of their team-mate
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Table 11.3: Perception of Cooperation and Risk-taking: comparison of Human and
AI team-mate. Dominance refers to how influential this is on the rating of enjoy-
ment/preference
to be high, and they were more likely to attribute ambiguous behavior as having the in-
tention to help and cooperate. However, with the computer team-mate, the participants
expected that the team-mate was more rigid and not able to adapt and coordinate as
well, therefore, they attended less to the altruistic actions of the computer team-mate,
could not imagine the computer’s effort level, and ambiguous actions were interpreted
as errors or ineffective computer algorithms. Furthermore, participants felt obligated to
recognize the efforts and altruistic acts of their human team-mates, whereas the com-
puter team-mate did not elicit any social pressure.
Aside from these factors, the study revealed that participants imagine and feel more
social benefits when cooperating with presumed human team-mates compared to com-
puter team-mates. Participants could also feel more emotionally connected with the
human team-mate and felt comfortable projecting their own emotions on the team-
mate. However, with the computer team-mate, the participants did not feel connected
emotionally and could not imagine the team-mate taking on their emotions.
The overview of how the framework explains these differences is provided in Ta-
ble 11.3.
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11.4.2 Framework Process Flow: Cooperation/Risk-taking
The framework is now applied to the cooperation/risk-taking study presented in a di-
agram to illustrate how the experience unfolds when interacting with either a human
team-mate or a computer team-mate. The differences are then discussed.
Figure 11.4: Process flow of CAF and the sacrifice study results indicating stereotypes,
personal consequences, and behaviors in context as highly dominant, emotional dis-
plays and perceiver’s own mental states have a moderate influence.
HUMAN TEAM-MATE: Cooperation/Risk-taking
The stereotypes for human team-mates included beliefs that they are more understand-
ing and adapt to the situation. Participants attended more to altruistic acts of the human
team-mates, considered the effort level of their team-mate to be high, and they were
more likely to attribute ambiguous behavior as having the intention to help and coop-
erate. Participants also felt pressure to be polite, respectful, and to notice when their
team-mate took risks and made efforts to cooperate.
Upon reflection of the experience, the player returns to their initial stereotypes for
human team-mates feels reassured that their team-mate is cooperative and making ob-
vious efforts to adapt to the situation.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is human-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical human team-mates are brought to mind and
include an image of a team-mate who is helpful, understanding, adapts to the
situation and more likely to cooperate and take risks for them.
(a) Social Motivations: player imagines that the interaction carries social ben-
efits, the nurturance they receive from the human team-mate is genuine, the
feeling is believed to be real and valid social attention.
(b) Personal consequences: much pressure to recognize the efforts and al-
truistic acts of the human team-mate. If they took risks, the player feels
obliged to take notice. This leads to attending more to these acts, noticing
them more.
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3. Schemas, Scripts: The player expects that the human team-mate will give as
much effort as possible, will be helpful and will try to adapt and coordinate
with them. In assessing all the behaviors of the team-mate, the player looks for
evidence to confirm and to support these expectations.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: expecting to see more risk-taking and cooperation,
therefore, the player attends more to these events.
• Emotional Displays: player imagines emotions through the team-mate
movements. For example, during tense moments, team-mate movements
are perceived as purposeful, seems to signify struggling and giving much
effort.
• Personal Projections: player feels comfortable in projecting their own
emotions and feels comfortable making assumptions about how the team-
mate is likely reacting emotionally to events in the game. Ambiguous
events are given emotion and intention to cooperate.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
COMPUTER TEAM-MATE: Cooperation/Risk-taking
The stereotypes for computer team-mates included beliefs that they are rigid, not able to
understand and adapt to the situation, and less likely to notice opportunities to take risks
and cooperate. Participants attended less to altruistic acts of the computer team-mates.
When employing typical stratgies to understand behaviors, the participants struggled
unable to imagine the effort level of their team-mate, and they were more likely to
ignore ambiguous behavior as being meaningless and without the intention to help and
cooperate. Participants did not feel any pressure to be polite or to take notice when
their team-mate took risks and made efforts to cooperate.
Upon reflection of the experience, the player returns to their initial stereotypes for
computer team-mates, feels reassured that their team-mate is less cooperative and takes
less risks on their behalf with little ability to adapt to the situation.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is computer-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: rigid, not able to understand and adapt to the situation and less
likely to notice opportunities to take risks and cooperate
(a) Social Motivations: player does not feel social benefits from the interac-
tion, the nurturance they receive from the computer team-mate feels con-
trived, it does not feel real or meaningful.
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(b) Personal consequences: there are no negative consequences for disregard-
ing the risk-taking or cooperation by the computer team-mate, therefore,
the player attends less to these behaviors and notices them less.
3. Schemas, Scripts: The player expects that the computer team-mate engage in
the game, however, it is doubtful how much the team-mate will be able to adapt
and coordinate with them or notice opportunities that they could take risks to help
the player. In assessing all the behaviors of the team-mate, the player expects
evidence to confirm and to support these expectations.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: Expecting to see less risk-taking and cooperation,
therefore, the player attends less to these events. The level of effort is also
unclear and difficult to imagine the level of effort for a computer.
• Emotional Displays: player is less likely to assign emotions to the team-
mate movements, therefore it is difficult for the player to estimate the effort
of the computer team-mate.
• Personal Projections: player does not project their own emotions onto
the computer team-mate because they can not imagine the computer hav-
ing mental states other than following instructions. Ambiguous events are
therefore discounted as meaningless.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
11.5 Applying the Framework: Protecting Team-mates
In the chapter that presented the study results for the Protecting Team-mates study,
participants protected AI team-mates team-mates significantly more compared to hu-
man team-mates, however, they believed that they had protected the human team-mates
more. In this section, the Cooperative Attribution Framework is used to explain these
results, first with a brief summary followed by a detailed review of the results using the
framework.
11.5.1 Overview of differences
As in previous studies, the findings suggest that top-down effects of the manipulation
of team-mate identity caused the players to subconsciously adopt schemas based on
stereotypes about human and computer team-mates. The stereotypes for human team-
mates included beliefs that computer team-mates need more help than human team-
mates because human team-mate can more easily adapt to the situation. Players also
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Table 11.4: Protective actions for Human and AI team-mates. Dominance refers to
how influential this is on the behavior and beliefs about protective actions.
felt obligated to reciprocate for protective behavior of their human team-mate and
attended more to their own protective behavior with them, engaging in a tit-for-tat
pattern of protective behavior. When they nurtured their human team-mate, they felt
social rewards more than when they protected the computer team-mate. Overall levels
of protection were significantly higher toward the computer team-mates even though
there was no pressure of reciprocity, the players protected them more, simply as much
as it seemed to help the team goals.
The framework reveals a tension between the obligation to help the human team-mate,
but this was tempered by the egoistic motivation of not wanting to do all the hard work
for them. With the human team-mate, participants protected the team-mate maintaining
a tit-for-tat strategy, however with the computer team-mate, they offered even more
protection because they were not bound by the social rule to engage in a tit-for-tat
strategy and simply offered protection as much as seemed useful. As it turns out, the
optimal strategy, statistically, was to protect the team-mate. Participants believed they
protected the human team-mate more because each action of protecting the team-mate
felt like more due to the social accounting of altruistic actions they maintained. With
the computer team-mate, protective actions were taken, but the human subject didn’t
attach the same concern for fairness in altruism.
The overview of how the framework explains these differences is provided in Ta-
ble 11.4.
11.5. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: PROTECTING TEAM-MATES 88
11.5.2 Framework Process Flow: Protection
The framework is now applied to the protection study results presented in a diagram to
illustrate how the experience unfolds when interacting with either a human team-mate
or a computer team-mate. The differences are then discussed.
Figure 11.5: Process flow of CAF and the protection study results indicating stereo-
types, social motivations, and personal consequences as highly dominant, emotional
displays have a moderate influence.
HUMAN TEAM-MATE: Protection
To summarize the mismatch in beliefs about protective behavior and actual behavior,
we should begin again by considering the stereotypes for the human team-mate. The
player felt as though the human team-mate adapts to the situation, is understanding.
At the same time, there was an obligation to recognize the efforts of the human and to
reciprocate the protective actions of their team-mate. The player attended more to their
protective actions toward the human, and each protective action included the feeling
of providing real nurturance to another human with much emotion and intention to
protect. Upon reflection of the experience, the player felt that they had protected the
human more because these protective actions were more memorable and meaningful to
them.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is human-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical human team-mates are brought to mind and
include an image of a team-mate who can adapt according to the situation and
likely does not need as much protection.
(a) Social Motivations: the interaction carries social benefits even if the player
doesn’t meet the team-mate. Protecting the team-mate is a meaningful act
of nurturing another person which brings social benefits.
(b) Personal consequences: pressure to be polite, and to reciprocate protective
actions from the team-mate, following at least a Tit-for-tat approach.
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3. Schemas, Scripts: the player expects a human team-mate to need less pro-
tection. Human team-mates are expected to coordinate and help each other to
achieve their individual goals in order to bring success for the team, but the hu-
man is also expected to “be a good team-mate” and lend a hand when possible.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: need for protection is constant, the team-mate seems
to give effort as needed, tries hard to win and to do their share of the group
effort.
• Emotional Displays: some movements may be perceived as calls for pro-
tection or distress, however, this is likely of little influence
• Personal Projections: easy to imagine the team-mate’s emotions, more
likely to consider calls for protection.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
COMPUTER TEAM-MATE: Protection
To summarize the mismatch in beliefs about protective behavior and actual behavior,
we should begin again by considering the stereotypes for the computer team-mate. The
player felt as though the computer team-mate is rigid, inflexible, and does not adapt
well to the situation, nor is it very understanding. Therefore, the computer needed
more protection. There was no obligation to reciprocate the protective actions of their
team-mate, the player did not attend much to their own actions of protection and did
not feelings of nurturance to these actions, they simply tried to protect the computer
team-mate as much as possible because it seemed like the best strategy in the game.
The protective actions were less memorable, thus the players felt they had protected
the computer less.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is computer-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical computer team-mates are brought to mind
and include an image of a team-mate rigid, perhaps efficient, but not as able to
adapt or recognize when the opportunity is there likely needs more protection.
(a) Social Motivations: the interaction has no social benefits. The act of pro-
tecting a team-mate is not a real act of nurturing, but it is done only if it
seems to be the best strategy in the game.
(b) Personal consequences: there is no pressure to be polite or offer protection
nor to reciprocate protective actions from the team-mate.
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3. Schemas, Scripts: the player expects a computer team-mate to need more pro-
tection. Computer team-mates are expected to be less able to adapt and coordi-
nate. Computer team-mates may not understand how to be a polite team-mate,
they would not understand or appreciate protective actions.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: need for protection is constant, but it is difficult to
imagine the effort level of the computer or to know when the computer
needs protection, therefore, protection is given as required by the situation
• Emotional Displays: no emotions are perceived, protection is given instru-
mentally, not out of empathy, however, this is likely of little influence
• Personal Projections: it is difficult to imagine the computer team-mate as
being capable of emotions, little impact on protective actions
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
11.6 Applying the Framework: Sacrificing Team-mates
In the chapter that presented the study results for the Sacrificing Team-mates study, par-
ticipants sacrificed AI team-mates team-mates significantly more compared to human
team-mates, but this was affected by the order in which the participants were exposed
to the team-mates. In this section, the Cooperative Attribution Framework is used to
explain these results, first with a brief summary followed by a detailed review of the
results using the framework.
11.6.1 Overview of differences
The DTP game was very different from the CTG game in that players could not move
and evade the opponent, but simply had to shoot carefully to try to do their share of hit-
ting enemy invaders. This study examined the effects of unequal distribution in power
and how this affected the choices to sacrifice or save the human or computer team-mate.
The findings suggest that top-down effects of the manipulation of team-mate identity
caused the players to subconsciously adopt schemas unique to human and computer
team-mates. Players felt obligated to resist placing the human team-mate in the sacri-
fice position, which led them to place the human in the protected position significantly
more than the computer team-mate. In addition to the sense of obligation, the players
felt that saving the human team-mate was more rewarding because this opportunity
for nurturing their team-mate was a valid social benefit, whereas the nurturing of a
computer team-mate doesn’t carry the same sense of social benefit.
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Table 11.5: Sacrificing Human and AI team-mates. Dominance refers to how influen-
tial this is on the behavior and beliefs about protective actions.
While the study on protection of team-mates enabled participants to engage in pro-
tective actions during the game sessions with essentially equal division of control in
the game, the study on sacrificing team-mates provided an unequal division of control
and required the participants to position their team-mate in the protected position or to
sacrifice them by placing them in a position of increased danger. The results suggest
that the computer team-mate was sacrificed more under certain conditions, which was
significant when the human was their first team-mate of the two sessions. While the
order of effects might suggest a weak result, it illustrates that rationalizing and strategy
in cooperative real-time games can change over time as the players become more fa-
miliar with the game. Some strategies become less pronounced over time, in this case,
the social obligation was valued less over time which led to increased sacrifice after
an initial attempt to protect the human team-mate. The reflections by the participants
revealed their order of priorities including winning, sacrificing their team-mate, and
the identity of their team-mate. These reflections further supported the dominance of
the personal pressures and social motivations for action.
The overview of how the framework explains these differences is provided in Ta-
ble 11.5.
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11.6.2 Framework Process Flow: Sacrifice
The framework is now applied to the sacrifice study presented in a diagram to illus-
trate how the experience unfolds when interacting with either a human team-mate or a
computer team-mate. The differences are then discussed.
Figure 11.6: Process flow of CAF and the sacrifice study results indicating social moti-
vations and personal consequences as highly dominant, perceiver’s own mental states
has a moderate influence.
HUMAN TEAM-MATE: Sacrifice
To summarize the increased levels of protection toward the human team-mate, the
schema for human players brings more social benefits and obligations. The players felt
obligated to resist placing the human team-mate in the sacrifice position significantly
more than the computer team-mate. In addition to the sense of obligation, the players
felt that saving the human team-mate was more rewarding because this opportunity for
nurturing their team-mate was a valid social benefit.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is human-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical human team-mates are brought to mind and
include an image of a team-mate who can adapt according to the situation and
likely does not actually need as much protection, and can perhaps step up to the
additional challenge in the sacrifice position.
(a) Social Motivations: the interaction carries social benefits even if the player
doesn’t meet the team-mate. Protecting the team-mate is a meaningful act
of nurturing another person which brings social benefits. Social benefits
outweigh individual gains.
(b) Personal consequences: social pressure to save the fellow human, and to
sacrifice the human team-mate only if necessary.
3. Schemas, Scripts: the player expects a human team-mate to need less protection
and that the team-mate will be able to step up to the challenge in the sacrifice
position and will be more understanding if placed in the sacrifice position.
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4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: not significant, there is little in terms of perceived
actions
• Emotional Displays: not significant, there is no communication of emo-
tions, the avatars are stationary
• Personal Projections: easy to imagine the team-mate’s emotions, if placed
in the sacrifice position, the human team-mate may feel “cheated”, there-
fore, sacrifice the human less.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
COMPUTER TEAM-MATE: Sacrifice
To explain the lower levels of protection toward the computer team-mate, the schema
for computer players brings no social benefits and no obligations. The players felt no
obligations to protect the computer and therefore placed the computer team-mate in the
sacrifice position significantly more than the human team-mate. Players sacrificed the
computer because it seemed like the best strategy and there was no social benefit for
nurturing the computer team-mate.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is computer-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical computer team-mates are brought to mind
and include an image of a team-mate rigid, perhaps efficient, but not as able to
adapt to the situation.
(a) Social Motivations: the interaction has no social benefits. The act of sac-
rifice is done if it is the best strategy in the game.
(b) Personal consequences: there is no pressure to be polite or offer protec-
tion, sacrificing the team-mate brings no negative connotations, therefore
decisions to sacrifice are made based on utility.
3. Schemas, Scripts: the player expects a computer team-mate to need more pro-
tection. Computer team-mates are expected to be less able to adapt and coordi-
nate, but will simply follow the instructions it is given.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: not significant, there is little in terms of perceived
actions
• Emotional Displays: not significant, there is no communication of emo-
tions, the avatars are stationary
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• Personal Projections: the player can not imagine the computer team-mate
as struggling or having complex emotions, but simply follows its instruc-
tions
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
11.7 Justifying the Framework
This section describes the justification the CAF by applying it to the results of two
related research studies on cooperative games that were discussed in the Related Work
(Chapter 2). In the next two sections, we follow the same process of assessing each of
the six categories for human and computer team-mates and provide an assessment using
the process flow diagram showing how these categories are engaged. By following the
same process that we have for our own studies, we evaluate the generalizability and
explanatory power of the framework. This exercise also provides new explanations for
the results in previous studies. This exercise also aims to generate additional insights
into ways the framework can be improved.
It is worthwhile to note the various challenges when applying the framework to previ-
ous studies: 1) there are limited studies looking at cooperative game interactions, thus
there are few comparisons that directly match the types of studies conducted in this
thesis upon which the framework was built 2) data provided in the papers describing
the studies can not be reviewed in the raw form, however the analyses in their stud-
ies can provide some important details. 3) there are various additional questions that
would be helpful to ask participants in previous studies to validate our analysis, how-
ever, this is not possible. Considering these challenges, we now examine two related
studies using the framework. The first study involved players in the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game and the second involves a simple interaction requiring players to trade
inventory items.
While the following sections examine the results of two studies focused on the coopera-
tive context, the framework can be applied to other contexts involving interactions with
human and computer team-mates, such as conversational and competitive interactions.
For example, in the study previously mentioned involving a competitive game using the
World of Warcaft system [60] players rated the human competitor higher for “liking”
compared to when the competitor was framed as a computer. The elements in the CAF
can explain this result in terms of the social motivations–the participants derived more
enjoyment from what they felt was a form of meaningful social interaction. In another
example, the study that compared responses to human and computer conversational
partners in an interview suggested that people engage more in impression management
with a conversational partner framed as human [4]. The CAF can be used to explain
these results–as the participants strive to understand their conversational partner and
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begin to invest in the social interaction, differences in social motivations suggest that
the human interaction is a more meaningful social interaction and at the same time, as
the participants try to infer the mental states of the computer conversant, their schema
for artificial agents prevents them from imagining complex and nuanced interactions.
In summary, while we focus on cooperative interactions in the following sections and
step through the application of the framework, it seems reasonable that the framework
can be applied to other contexts.
11.8 Applying the Framework: Commitment to Coop-
eration
The study described in [52], participants played the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
with human and computer team-mates with results suggesting higher levels commit-
ment to cooperate when they were paired up with human team-mates. They honored
commitments less when paired up with a computer team-mate. In this section, the
Cooperative Attribution Framework is used to explain these results, first with a brief
summary followed by a detailed review of the results using the framework.
11.8.1 Overview of differences
As in previous studies, the findings suggest that top-down effects of the manipulation
of team-mate identity caused the players to subconsciously adopt schemas based on
stereotypes about human and computer team-mates. The stereotypes for human team-
mates included beliefs that computer team-mates follow an algorithm, while a human
team-mates would likely honor their commitments more. Players also felt obligated
to honor their commitments more to human team-mates. When they honored their
commitments to their human team-mate, they felt social rewards more than when they
made commitments to a computer team-mate. In [52], the researchers claimed that
commitments can be elicited easily, perhaps even by a machine. In their analysis, they
claim that people make commitments to other entities, not believing they are human,
but because they themselves are human and that is what humans feel they need to do.
The following detailed analysis examines the six categories of the framework to iden-
tify which of the categories have a dominant influence on the differences noted in the
study results. We proposed that a comparison can be made for each of the six cate-
gories and how they relate to human an computer team-mates as shown in Figure 10.4.
We present provide the side-by-side comparison in Table 11.6.
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Commitment to: Human
Team-mates









(commitment brings a social
benefit)





(Social contract obliges com-
mitment)





















(Easy to project: expect
commitment)
(No projection: can com-
puter choose to commit-
ment?)
Low
Stereotypes (Humans know and respect
social contracts)
(Computers follow their al-
gorithm)
High
Table 11.6: Commitment to Human and AI team-mates. Dominance refers to how in-
fluential this is on the behavior and beliefs about honoring commitments to cooperate.
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11.8.2 Framework Process Flow: Commitment to Cooperate
The framework is now applied to the Prisoner’s Dilemma study results presented in
a diagram to illustrate how the experience likely unfolds when interacting with either
a human team-mate or a computer team-mate. The differences are then discussed.
The dominant categories are very similar to the analysis of the Protection study re-
sults, however, the face to face contact between the human team-mate and the research
subjects likely caused for emotional displays to be readily accessible and active when
attempting to infer the mental state of the team-mate.
Figure 11.7: Process flow of CAF and the Prisoner’s Dilemma study results indicat-
ing stereotypes, social motivations, emotional displays and personal consequences as
highly dominant.
HUMAN TEAM-MATE: Commitment to cooperate
To summarize the increased commitment to cooperate toward human team-mates, we
should begin again by considering the stereotypes for the human team-mate. The player
felt as though the human team-mate knows and respects social contracts. At the same
time, there was an obligation to honor the commitments to cooperate with the human.
In the human-human condition, research subjects could see the expressions on the face
of their team-mate, which increased the confidence that the human team-mate would
honor their commitment, leading to more commitment from the research subject.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is human-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: humans know and respect social contracts, therefore, it is more
likely the team-mate will honor their commitment to cooperate.
(a) Social Motivations: the interaction carries social benefits, the players meet
face-to-face. Honoring a commitment to another human brings social ben-
efits.
(b) Personal consequences: pressure to honor the social contract and honor
the commitment to cooperate with another human.
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3. Schemas, Scripts: the player expects a human team-mate will cooperate. Hu-
man team-mates are expected to cooperate,“be a good team-mate”.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: priming exercise included face to face time with the
human team-mate resulting in increased confidence of the human team-
mate’s commitment.
• Emotional Displays: emotions could be observed and therefore, bluffing
was less expected, increase in commitment
• Personal Projections: easy to imagine the team-mate’s emotions, more
likely to expect commitment.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
COMPUTER TEAM-MATE: Commitment to Cooperate
To summarize the decreased commitment to cooperate toward computer team-mates,
we should begin again by considering the stereotypes for the computer team-mate. The
player felt as though the computer team-mate is not able to understand social contracts.
At the same time, there was no obligation to honor the commitments to cooperate
with the computer. In the human-computer conditions, research subjects could see a
representation of a computer team-mate, however, more human-like attributes resulted
in decreased preference by the subjects.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is computer-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Computers follow their algorithm and don’t have a built in appre-
ciation for social contracts, therefore, it is less likely the team-mate will honor
their commitment to cooperate.
(a) Social Motivations: the interaction does not carry social benefits, honoring
a commitment to a computer is meaningless.
(b) Personal consequences: No social contract, therefore, no pressure to com-
mit to cooperate with a computer.
3. Schemas, Scripts: the player expects a computer team-mate will follow their
alogrithm, which determines its cooperative behavior.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: no past experience to judge behavior.
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• Emotional Displays: emotions could be observed and therefore, bluffing
was less expected, increase in commitment
• Personal Projections: unlikely to consider projecting emotions, with more
human-like cues, reduced preference, resulting in reduced commitment.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
11.9 Applying the Framework: Arousal
The study described in [60] involved participants who engaged in a cooperative trading
task in an immersive virtual environment with human and computer team-mates. In
that study, the researchers modified a World of Warcraft game level such that the par-
ticipant would approach another character, presumably controlled by either a human
or computer, and then for a period of two minutes, trade items on their inventory lists
so that they each would end up with a specific list of items. The researchers of that
study acknowledged that the interaction was intended to be a cooperative game, yet it
does not require coordination within the game space and the cooperative task is only
slightly game-like. Their results suggested that any differences in liking of the com-
puter agent were not significant. They did find significant differences in the arousal
as measured by heart rate and skin conductance, finding higher levels of arousal when
participants thought they were interacting with another human compared to a computer
agent. An interesting aspect of their study highlights the importance of the design of
cooperative interaction and the impact on self reported experience. Participants rated
how much they like the co-player which resulted in only non significant differences be-
tween human and computer co-players. While the differences in physiological arousal
suggest that the participants respond differently to human and computer team-mates,
the non-significant differences in self-reported measures suggest that the cooperative
game experience should offer opportunities for team-mates to demonstrate proficiency,
skill, and effort in order to engage the more complex mindreading processes. In this
section, the Cooperative Attribution Framework is used to explain these results, first
with a brief summary followed by a detailed review of the results using the framework.
11.9.1 Overview of differences
The higher level of arousal with human team-mates is largely due to a sense that co-
operation with another human carries more social benefits of a “real” social interac-
tion, even without any actual social contact outside of the game. Supporting evidence
from stereotype related questions suggest that players have a schema for a “cooperative
game”, of which a human team-mate is a crucial component for enjoyment. The par-
ticipant watches and interacts with their human team-mate’s avatar feeling comfortable
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(More arousal: feels like real
social interaction)





(More arousal: pressure to
cooperate)





















(More arousal: easy to imag-
ine how team-mate feels)
(Less arousal: can’t imag-
ine that team-mate can feel
at all)
Med
Stereotypes (More arousal: social games
should involve people)
(Less arousal: playing alone
is not social)
High
Table 11.7: Arousal: comparison of Human and AI team-mate. Dominance refers to
the proposed influence this is on physiological arousal
in reading emotions and intentions, whereas with the computer team-mate, there is no
authentic social experience, and no shared emotionally charged moments. Participants
evaluate the computer team-mates simply for their performance in the game.
The following detailed analysis examines the six categories of the framework to iden-
tify which of the categories have a dominant influence on the differences noted in the
study results. We proposed that a comparison can be made for each of the six cate-
gories and how they relate to human an computer team-mates as shown in Figure 10.4.
We present provide the side-by-side comparison in Table 11.7.
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11.9.2 Framework Process Flow: Arousal
The framework is now applied to the arousal study results presented in [60]. We present
a diagram to illustrate how the experience unfolds when interacting with either a human
team-mate or a computer team-mate. We discuss the step by step process for the human
team-mate, followed by the computer team-mate to serve as a comparison.
Figure 11.8: Process flow of CAF and the sacrifice study results indicating stereotypes,
social motivations, and personal consequences as highly dominant, behaviors in con-
text, emotional displays, and perceiver’s own mental states have a moderate influence.
HUMAN TEAM-MATE: Arousal
To summarize the higher levels of physiological arousal with the presumed human
team-mate, the schema for cooperative game is an activity that involves enjoying an
activity with another human. The player enters the game with this expectation and also
expects that the team-mate adapts well to the situation at hand, is more understanding
and that the interactions with them will be a valid form of social attention. There is also
an obligation to recognize the efforts of the human and to appreciate their intention to
cooperate. There is an overall higher level of attentiveness to the interaction with the
human team-mate.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is human-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical human team-mates are brought to mind and
include an image of a team-mate who is understanding, adapts to the situation.
Among the stereotypes, the player believes that cooperative games are fun be-
cause of a team-mate being human.
(a) Social Motivations: player imagines that the interaction carries real social
benefits and social attention.
(b) Personal consequences: player feels social pressure to cooperate in the
game.
3. Schemas, Scripts: The player expects that the human team-mate will give as
much effort as possible, will try to adapt and coordinate, is motivated by the
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goal in the game, but also motivated by the social interaction. In assessing all
the behaviors of the team-mate, the player looks for evidence to confirm and to
support these expectations.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
• Behaviors in context: more perceived intention, effort, more confidence
in the partner actions
• Emotional Displays: player easily imagines and attends to the emotions
of the team-mate
• Personal Projections: player feels comfortable in projecting their own
emotions and feels comfortable making assumptions about how the team-
mate is likely reacting emotionally to events in the game.
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
COMPUTER TEAM-MATE: Arousal
To summarize the lower levels of physiological arousal with the computer team-mate,
the schema for cooperative game is an activity that is enjoyed less with a computer
human. The player enters the game with this expectation and also expects that the team-
mate is rigid, may not adapt well, and is less understanding. Interactions with them
are not expected to involve real social attention. There is no obligation to recognize
the efforts of the computer and it is difficult to imagine a computer having the intention
to cooperate. There is an overall lower level of attentiveness to the interaction with the
computer team-mate.
1. Identity: player is told their team-mate is computer-controlled.
2. Stereotypes: Stereotypes for typical computer team-mates are brought to mind
and include an image of a team-mate who is rigid and less able to adapt. Among
the stereotypes, the player believes that cooperative games are less fun with a
computer team-mate.
(a) Social Motivations: the interaction does not carry any social benefits or
social attention.
(b) Personal consequences: player feels no pressure to cooperate.
3. Schemas, Scripts: The player expects that the computer team-mate will follow
the algorithm it is programmed to follow and therefore may not be able to adapt.
The computer does not have intentions of its own.
4. Perceptions of game events and team-mate behavior
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• Behaviors in context: computer simply follows algorithm, difficulty in
imagining a computer having intention and effort.
• Emotional Displays: player can not imagine a computer having emotions
• Personal Projections: player does not imagine the computer has feelings
therefore, no projection
5. Schemas Evaluated: The player considers how well the schema fits their expe-
rience.
6. If it is not considered a Special Case for the schema, it is considered an outlier
or chance difference and the player continues the process by reconfirming the
stereotype continuing on step (2). If the difference is considered a special case,
adjustments are made to the schema for the team-mate in step (7).
7. Adjustments to Stereotypes and Schema are made and the process starts again
at step (2).
11.10 Limitations of the CAF
This section discusses some of the limitations of the framework including concerns
about the narrow focus on dyadic relationships, which makes it unclear how the frame-
work applies to larger groups, concerns that more rich modes of communication are not
accounted for in the framework, and concerns that cultural issues are not specifically
addressed in the framework. We now discuss these issues in more detail.
The studies conducted in this thesis and the studies from the related work that were
used to justify the framework involved dyadic relationships. It raises the concern that it
is unclear how the framework would scale to larger team-mate relationships. Although
the focus of the framework was on the individual acting in a dyad, the choice of fo-
cusing on the most simple team configuration avoids the problems and complexities of
studying coalitions, which would be interesting future expansions for this work.
The role of communication in team-mate relationships is very important in many situ-
ations. The studies conducted in this thesis did not involve communication aside from
the blinking yellow of the avatar to signal the “draw fire” action. While minimal com-
munication channels, such as those available in the games used in this research, have
been shown to provide rich opportunities to share meaning [50], the framework does
not address rich forms of communication. It was a deliberate choice to keep the frame-
work general, yet expandable. While the development of the framework was focused
on cooperative games and is useful for the game context, it could also be useful for
explaining differences in other contexts such as competitive games or conversational
interactions. Future refinement and progressive elaboration of its components signal
important future work.
Another aspect of team-mate interaction that has not been represented in detail are the
various cultural issues that influence the response to team-mates. The demographics
of the participants in the studies presented in this thesis were from Singapore, mostly
ethnic Chinese, and of a narrow age range. It is possible that players from different cul-
tures would respond differently, yet the CAF does not specifically account for cultural
differences such as power distance, the degree of collectivism/individualism, among
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others. It is likely that the elements defined as “personal concerns” and “social motiva-
tions” are appropriate for exploring cultural differences. This suggests important future
work in the development of the framework, yet it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
11.11 Summary
In this chapter we applied the Cooperative Attribution Framework to explain the re-
sults of our studies that were presented in (Chapters 5-9). We justified the framework
by applying it to the results of two studies discussed previously in the Related Work
(Chapter 2). The main insights provided by this analysis is that players adopt different
schemas for human and computer team-mates which result in attending more to certain
aspects of the experience. The differences are largely due to the players being unable
to imagine that an AI team-mate could have certain attributes (e.g., emotional dispo-
sitions). This leads to different interpretations of the same events and it also affects
the strategies players use to evaluate and make sense of their team-mates. This chapter
concluded with discussion about the limitations of the framework. In the next chapter,
we provide overall conclusions of this thesis.
Chapter 12
Conclusion
This thesis set out to reveal some of the differences in response to human and computer
team-mates, develop an explanatory framework to reveal causes, motivation, and ratio-
nale behind the differences, and then test the framework by using it to analyze related
research. Various studies were conducted in which players cooperated with team-mates
that were thought to be controlled by either a human or computer and then answered
questions about the experience. Logged data from player behaviors and in-game events
supplemented findings from the self-reported data revealing differences in perception,
behaviors toward team-mates, and even differences in the players’ perceptions of their
own actions. Through the development of the Cooperative Attribution Framework, it
becomes more clear why these differences exist. It seems that players fail to imagine
that artificial agents have certain attributes (adaptability, performance, feelings, inten-
tion, etc.), which affects the expectations players have for the cooperative experience
with them. With differences in expectations, otherwise equivalent experiences are per-
ceived very differently.
In this chapter, we describe the contribution of this work in more detail and then discuss
limitations and future research exploring the differences in response to human and
computer team-mates.
12.1 Contribution of this work
This thesis is situated within the field of HCI research focused on cooperation with
artificial partners. There are two main contributions presented in this thesis including
the empirical contribution of revealing differences in responses to human and computer
team-mates, including differences in perception judgment, and behaviors, and a theo-
retical contribution with the development of an explanatory framework to reveal some
of the causes for these differences. This thesis provides an additional contribution by
suggesting implications for the design of artificial team-mates.
We conducted game-based user studies that examined direct comparisons between re-
sponses to humans and computers and claim that, in various situations, players spend
considerable effort trying to understand the capabilities of the team-mate and consid-
ering the social context, which inevitably results in differences in perception, behavior,
and evaluations. Significant differences were found in studies that examined the four
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main components of cooperation, which suggests that cooperation with human and
computer team-mates is a substantially different experience, even in otherwise equiva-
lent interactions.
To explain the differences in response to human and computer team-mates, the Co-
operative Attribution Framework was developed. The framework builds on relevant
theories from social psychology and cognitive science and focuses on the strategies
players use to infer the mental state of their team-mates and the self-centric concerns
of personal pressures and social motivations when cooperating with team-mates. The
framework provides explanations for the results of the user studies presented in this
thesis, and was justified by applying it to the results of other research studies discussed
in the related work (Chapter 2).
Aside from the primary contributions of revealing and explaining differences in re-
sponse to human and computer team-mates, this thesis also makes a contribution in the
form of implications for the design of artificial team-mates. While it does not provide
prescriptive guidance on how to compensate for difference in response to the team-
mates, this work suggests that designers can evaluate, debug, and refine their team-
mate AI by taking a systematic approach. Developers can look for key events that are
intrepreted in very different ways, for example, when a team-mate pauses in the CTG
game, it was interpreted in very different ways depending on the framed identity of the
team-mate. Developers can observe users and identify similar types of events. Once
those events are identified, further design choices can be explored and evaluated with
the users.
12.2 Limitations of this work
The work presented in this thesis provides evidence that suggests differences in the
response to team-mates and provides a framework that can be used to analyze other
related studies. There are limitations, some of which were discussed in the chapters
describing the user studies and in the discussion section, however, the most important
limitations involve aspects of the game context and the research method. These are
discussed now in more detail.
12.2.1 Limitations: Game context
In terms of the game context, the the games were very simple, players did not know
their human team-mates, and the scenarios only involved dyads. The games used in
the studies were very simple – the graphics were flat, two dimensional, and there were
no sound effects. While it might at first seem to be a limitation, the simplicity of
the games used in the study are a strength of the work. The games were fast-paced,
rated as very enjoyable by the participants, allow for equivalent comparisons across
team-mates, and are quite similar to typical casual games that are popular with mobile
gamers. The studies were conducted with a single algorithm for the team-mate partner
in order to keep the game experience consistent across all game sessions. Although
the effects were significant using the team-mate at the current skill level, which was
usually more skilled than the subject, it would be worthwhile to examine how team-
mates of other skill levels would be perceived. Another possible limitation of this
study is that it did not allow the participants to meet or interact with their presumed
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human team-mates. Familiarity with the human participant would likely influence the
ways human players would experience the game and respond. Studying people who
are already familiar with each other is a difficult context to study using a quantitative
approach, and although the present findings are still important against the backdrop
of the many anonymous gamers in CVEs, it is a logical next step to find out how the
present research generalizes into other typical team-mate pairings. Furthermore, the
studies focused only on dyadic interactions and did not study larger teams. While these
various limitations to the game context studied do not impact the findings of the study,
they do signal substantial potential for future work including studies of more complex
games, larger teams, and artificial team-mates of different skill levels.
12.2.2 Limitations: Research Method
In terms of the research method, the interactions were very short, more questions could
have been asked, biosignals were not taken, and more close analysis could have been
performed on video recordings of game play.
The studies presented involved interactions that were approximately five minutes per
session. Although this may seem like a short time, it is typical for this domain of study
[60], providing an adequate amount of time for the subjects to understand and play the
game, yet not become bored by the end of the research session. It would be advan-
tageous, however, to conduct studies of longer duration. In [71] researchers propose
that impression development takes longer in contexts involving less social cues, and
extended exposure may in fact result in a reduction in differences. Another possible
limitation of the research method could be the measurements used. Certainly, more
questions could have been asked by the subjects, their movements in the game could
have been video recorded for in-depth analysis, and biosignals of the participants could
have been taken. Although those all remain valuable measurements that could bring
interesting results, the findings of the present studies are substantial and the reduction
in the number of measures was a deliberate choice made to ensure that the subjects did
not tire from the inquiry and focus more on the game and their response to the coop-
erative game. It is worthwhile to note that a focus on ethnographic methods as used in
[94, 72] could be helpful in future research to gain a better understanding of team-mate
interactions “in the wild.”
12.3 Future Research
While there are many possibilities for future exploration of the topic, perhaps one of
the most intriguing possibilities for future work looks toward recent developments in
CSCW in which conversational agent technologies are being designed to recognize the
mental schemas adopted by the users and then adapt the system appropriately [59]. As
proposed in recent research on the design of artificial agents, researchers propose that
trying to build artificial agents that mimic life is not the most important focus. Instead, a
more promising solution is to develop an active system that tries to determine and adjust
to the human stance – to recognize if the person is treating the agent like a machine or
a human, and to react accordingly [46]. There is much exciting work ahead!
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